United States v. Medina-Carrasco
815 F.3d 457
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Defendant Jose Medina-Carrasco pleaded guilty via a federal "fast-track" plea agreement to illegal reentry after deportation and was sentenced to 55 months’ imprisonment (below the PSR guidelines range of 57–71 months).\
- The written plea agreement contained an 18‑cell sentencing grid (three offense levels × six criminal‑history categories) and a broad appellate waiver: defendant waived "any right to file an appeal... or any aspect of the defendant’s sentence — including the manner in which the sentence is determined and any sentencing guideline determinations," "provided the defendant receives a sentence in accordance with this fast-track plea agreement."\
- At the Rule 11 colloquy the magistrate judge explained the grid and the 4–87 month possible range; defendant confirmed understanding and that he waived appeal and collateral rights.\
- The PSR applied a 16‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) treating a prior Arizona aggravated assault conviction as a "crime of violence," yielding offense level 21 and CHC IV (57–71 months). Defense counsel conceded the conviction was a crime of violence at sentencing and sought a downward variance; no guideline objection was lodged.\
- Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the appellate waiver was ambiguous/unenforceable and (2) the §2L1.2 enhancement was incorrect because the prior conviction did not categorically qualify as a crime of violence. The panel dismissed the appeal, holding the waiver valid and enforceable.\
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of appellate waiver | Government: waiver language covers appeals of sentencing and guideline determinations when sentence is "in accordance with" plea agreement | Medina‑Carrasco: phrase "in accordance with" is ambiguous — could mean either (a) sentence within grid OR (b) sentence based on correct guideline calculation; ambiguity makes waiver not knowing/voluntary | Waiver is enforceable: "in accordance with" means the ultimate sentence need only fall within the agreed grid; written waiver + Rule 11 colloquy show defendant knowingly waived challenges to guideline determinations; appeal dismissed |
| Scope of "in accordance with" caveat | Government: caveat means if sentence falls within the grid ranges, waiver applies | Medina‑Carrasco: caveat could require correct guideline application (so incorrect calculation preserves appeal) | Court adopts government view; rejects defendant's alternate reading as rendering waiver's "any sentencing guideline determinations" language meaningless and self-defeating |
| Sufficiency of Rule 11 colloquy to cure ambiguity | Government: colloquy explained grid, confirmed defendant's understanding and waiver | Medina‑Carrasco: colloquy did not clarify the caveat’s parameters or the complex grid; ambiguity remained | Colloquy + written agreement are sufficient to show defendant knew judge would determine placement in the grid and that he waived challenges to that determination |
| Merits of §2L1.2 "crime of violence" enhancement | N/A (government applied enhancement) | Medina‑Carrasco: prior Arizona aggravated assault conviction under A.R.S. §13‑203(A)(3) ("knowingly touching... with intent to injure, insult or provoke") does not categorically require violent force | Court did not reach merits because waiver bars challenge; dissent would find §13‑203(A)(3) non‑violent under Johnson and would reverse for plain error |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Charles, 581 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2009) (standard for enforceability of appellate waivers)\
- United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (waiver enforceable if language covers appeal and waiver was knowing/voluntary)\
- United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333 (9th Cir. 1993) (assessing what defendant reasonably understood at plea)\
- United States v. Cope, 527 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2008) (interpret plea agreements under ordinary contract rules; ambiguities construed against drafter)\
- United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000) (valid waivers enforced even if appellate claims might be meritorious)\
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (government bears burden to show waiver was voluntary)\
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (touching does not constitute violent force for ACCA/force‑based definitions)\
- United States v. Marcia‑Acosta, 780 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 2015) (definition of "crime of violence" under §2L1.2)