United States v. Medina
779 F.3d 55
| 1st Cir. | 2015Background
- Medina, previously convicted in Indiana (2008) of sexual battery of a minor, moved to Puerto Rico in 2012 without registering as a sex offender and was charged under SORNA, 18 U.S.C. § 2250.
- He pled guilty to the SORNA offense and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment plus 20 years of supervised release.
- The supervised-release order included two contested special conditions: a broad ban on pornography/sexually stimulating materials and a requirement to submit to penile plethysmograph (PPG) testing if his sex-offender treatment program required it.
- Medina objected to the supervised-release term length and to both special conditions; the district court adopted the presentence report’s guidelines calculation and imposed the conditions with minimal on‑the‑record justification.
- The First Circuit found the guidelines classification error (treating a SORNA failure‑to‑register as a "sex offense") and held the district court provided inadequate, case‑specific justification for the pornography ban and the PPG condition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper length of supervised release (20 years) | Medina: SORNA failure‑to‑register is not a "sex offense" under the Sentencing Guidelines; recommended range is 5 years to 5 years (statutory min) | Gov't: district court’s guidelines classification; asks for plain‑error review but concedes the issue | Court: district court erred in classifying SORNA offense as a "sex offense"; plain error; vacated and remanded for resentencing on supervised release length |
| Blanket ban on pornography/sexually stimulating material | Medina: ban is overbroad and court failed to provide a reasoned, case‑specific justification tying the ban to recidivism risk or § 3553(a) factors | Gov't: condition reasonable to reduce recidivism; record permitted inference; cites treatment/compliance interests | Court: vacated pornography ban—Perazza‑Mercado controls; no evidence linking legal adult pornography to Medina’s offense and district court gave no adequate on‑the‑record justification |
| Requirement to submit to PPG testing if treatment program orders it | Medina: PPG is highly invasive, of disputed reliability, and the district court failed to make the required defendant‑specific findings; facial challenge preserved | Gov't: challenge premature or facially meritless because PPG is widely used in treatment and condition contingent on program rules | Court: PPG condition facially unreasonable on this record; district court failed to make the required on‑the‑record, defendant‑specific evidentiary findings about necessity, efficacy, and alternatives; vacated and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511 (7th Cir.) (guidance that SORNA failure is not a guidelines "sex offense")
- Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Guidelines are advisory; correct calculation required for sentencing review)
- United States v. Millán‑Isaac, 749 F.3d 57 (1st Cir.) (proper guidelines calculation prerequisite to discretionary sentencing)
- United States v. Perazza‑Mercado, 553 F.3d 65 (1st Cir.) (vacating a total pornography ban for lack of case‑specific justification)
- United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552 (9th Cir.) (PPG testing is exceptionally intrusive; requires heightened justification under § 3583(d))
- United States v. McLaurin, 731 F.3d 258 (2d Cir.) (PPG testing implicates significant dignity interests; district court must make detailed, defendant‑specific findings)
- United States v. Sebastian, 612 F.3d 47 (1st Cir.) (facially unreasonable standard for contingent treatment‑related conditions and distinction for conditional program‑compliance bans)
- United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 49 (1st Cir.) (challenge to explicitly stated contingent condition is ripe)
- United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.) (upholding polygraph condition; discusses limits of facial challenges to contingent conditions)
- United States v. Ramos, 763 F.3d 45 (1st Cir.) (distinguishing and applying Perazza‑Mercado in pornography‑ban context)
