1:18-cr-01966
D.N.M.Apr 16, 2020Background
- Defendants Nick L. Medeiros (a service‑disabled veteran) and Bobby Greaves are charged in a superseding indictment with conspiracy, major fraud, wire fraud, and making false statements arising from alleged abuse of the Service‑Disabled Veteran‑Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) program.
- Medeiros and Greaves formed NJM, Inc. (Medeiros 51%, Greaves 49%); Greaves previously co‑owned JSR, Inc. (Nancy Greaves 51%, Bobby 49%); both companies shared an address and business relationships relevant to VA/DoD contracting.
- VA initially denied NJM SDVOSB status in 2012 because of control and affiliation concerns, then granted reconsideration (and renewed certification in 2014); NJM obtained over $3 million in federal contracts 2012–2016.
- The superseding indictment alleges defendants misrepresented the NJM–JSR relationship, "passed off" JSR employees as NJM employees, altered resumes, concealed JSR’s role, and falsely certified NJM’s SDVOSB independence in procuring contracts.
- Defendants moved for a bill of particulars within 14 days of the superseding indictment seeking details on eight enumerated acts; the Government opposed as untimely and substantively unnecessary given the indictment and extensive discovery.
- The Court held the motion timely (a superseding indictment resets Rule 7(f)) but denied the bill of particulars on the merits: the superseding indictment tracks statutory language, lists dates and overt acts, and combined with voluminous discovery gives defendants adequate notice to prepare a defense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f) | Motion is time‑barred because defendants were arraigned on the original (2018) indictment | Motion filed within 14 days of the superseding indictment; timely | Motion is timely; a superseding indictment restarts the 7(f) clock |
| Sufficiency of the indictment (fair notice) | Superseding indictment tracks statutory language and alleges dates, overt acts, and objectives; thus sufficient | Indictment lacks particularity about how/when defendants committed specific charged acts | Indictment is sufficient: cites statutes, gives date ranges, and lists overt acts with specific conduct |
| Need for bill of particulars vs. discovery | Bill unnecessary because Government produced extensive discovery touching on overt acts | Defendants need particulars identifying manner/time of the eight enumerated acts to prepare defense | Denied: given indictment details plus voluminous discovery, a bill is not warranted; a bill is not a substitute for discovery |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Chisum, 502 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2007) (indictment must set forth elements, give fair notice, and permit double jeopardy defense)
- United States v. Dashney, 117 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1997) (same standard for indictment sufficiency)
- United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting statute plus date/place/nature of illegal activity can suffice)
- United States v. Dunn, 841 F.2d 1026 (10th Cir. 1988) (indictment need not allege detailed factual proof)
- United States v. Doe, 572 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2009) (statutory language with date/place/nature is adequate)
- United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1996) (purpose of bill of particulars is to give sufficient precision to prepare a defense; not to disclose all evidence)
- United States v. Lundstrom, 880 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 2018) (bill of particulars is not a discovery device)
- United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2011) (indictment phrased in statutory terms is generally sufficient)
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (words of a statute that fully and expressly set forth all elements satisfy indictment requirements)