United States v. McKinney, 382 F. Supp. 3d 1163

Background

Defendant Jason McKinney pled guilty (2007) to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and to a § 924(c) firearms offense; sentenced in 2009 to 360 months + 60 months consecutive (420 months total).
At sentencing the court converted drug quantities to marijuana equivalence, arrived at base offense level 38, applied adjustments (including role and obstruction) to reach adjusted offense level 42, criminal history V, guideline range 360 months to life.
McKinney moved under § 404 of the First Step Act (2018), which makes sections 2–3 of the Fair Sentencing Act (2010) retroactively applicable, seeking a sentence reduction and arguing the court may conduct a plenary resentencing and consider post‑sentencing rehabilitation.
The parties agreed that retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act would not change McKinney’s advisory Guidelines range.
The government argued, and the court majority held, that the First Step Act does not authorize full de novo resentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); it permits only recalculation of Guidelines affected by the Fair Sentencing Act and a possible reduction consistent with that recalculation.
The court denied McKinney’s motion because the Fair Sentencing Act did not change his Guidelines range; it concluded a plenary resentencing was not authorized and, alternatively, that a reduction was not warranted in its discretion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the First Step Act authorizes plenary (de novo) resentencing under § 3582(c)(1)(B)	First Step Act's language (may “impose” a reduced sentence) places no limit; court may consider post‑sentencing rehabilitation and conduct full resentencing	First Step Act does not expressly permit plenary resentencing; § 3582(c)(1)(B) is a narrow, finality‑preserving vehicle	Court held First Step Act does not authorize full resentencing; only recalculation of affected Guidelines and possible reduction consistent therewith
Whether a reduction is warranted when retroactive application does not change the Guidelines range	Even if Guidelines unchanged, court may reduce sentence based on statutory changes and § 3553(a) factors, including rehabilitation	Reduction is not authorized when Guidelines unchanged; even if authorized, court may decline reduction in its discretion	Court denied reduction because Fair Sentencing Act did not alter McKinney’s Guidelines range and it would not exercise discretion to reduce
Whether the word “impose” in § 404(b) signals broad remedial power to resentence	“Impose” implies authority to re‑sentence fully	“Impose” must be read in context of § 3582(c) and Rule 43; context shows limited remedy	Court agreed with precedents that “impose” does not authorize plenary resentencing
Whether post‑sentencing rehabilitation must be considered in a § 3582(c) proceeding	Rehabilitation is relevant and may support variance if plenary resentencing allowed	Courts are not required to consider post‑sentencing rehabilitation in § 3582(c) proceedings; Dillon/10th Circuit authority supports limits	Court noted Tenth Circuit precedent that courts need not consider post‑sentencing rehabilitation in § 3582 proceedings and did not rely on such evidence

Key Cases Cited

Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (describing Fair Sentencing Act changes to crack cocaine thresholds)
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (§ 3582 sentence‑reduction proceedings are a narrow exception to finality)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (guidelines and sentencing framework principles)
United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1998) (statutory construction presumption that Congress means what it says)
United States v. Quary, 881 F.3d 820 (10th Cir. 2018) (distinguishing sentence reductions from full resentencings)
United States v. Verdín‑Garcia, 824 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2016) (district courts not required to consider post‑sentencing rehabilitation in § 3582 proceedings)