United States v. McGriff
20-3157-cr
| 2d Cir. | Mar 28, 2022Background
- Kenneth McGriff was convicted in 2007 of multiple offenses (racketeering, murder-for-hire, drug distribution, and money transaction offenses) and sentenced to concurrent terms including eight life sentences; Count 14 carried a life sentence for possession with intent to distribute large quantities of cocaine and crack under 21 U.S.C. § 841.
- The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) raised crack-cocaine quantity thresholds (e.g., 50g → 280g) and altered mandatory minima and maxima for certain § 841 offenses; it was not retroactive when enacted.
- The First Step Act (2018) § 404(b) permits district courts to reduce sentences of defendants whose offenses were covered by the Fair Sentencing Act, allowing courts to impose a reduced sentence "as if" the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time of the offense.
- In June 2020 McGriff moved pro se under § 404(b) for a sentence reduction; the District Court found him eligible but denied relief, concluding a reduction on Count 14 would be purely academic given McGriff’s other life sentences, and denied appointment of counsel.
- McGriff appealed, arguing among other things that the District Court failed to apply 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and abused its discretion in deeming any reduction academic and in refusing counsel.
- The Second Circuit remanded because the District Court’s opinion did not make clear whether it calculated or considered the reduced statutory maximum (a 40-year maximum for certain crack quantities under the Fair Sentencing Act) when denying relief, and directed reconsideration if the reduced maximum was not considered.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eligibility under First Step Act § 404(b) | McGriff: Count 14 is a covered offense and he is eligible for relief. | Government/District Court: Count 14 is eligible but relief is discretionary. | Court: McGriff is eligible; District Court correctly treated Count 14 as a covered offense. |
| Whether District Court had to apply § 3553(a) factors | McGriff: District Court abused discretion by failing to consider § 3553(a) factors. | District Court: Not required to apply § 3553(a) in every First Step Act case; it considered relevant factors. | Court: No abuse; § 3553(a) not mandatory in every case and record shows consideration of key factors. |
| Whether reduction would be "purely academic" given other life sentences | McGriff: Denial was improper because First Step Act relief should be considered regardless of other sentences. | District Court: Other concurrent life sentences made reduction on Count 14 practically meaningless. | Court: No abuse of discretion in treating other life sentences as relevant and possibly dispositive. |
| Denial of appointed counsel for First Step Act motion | McGriff: Needed counsel for effective advocacy. | District Court: No statutory right to counsel for § 3582(c) / First Step Act proceedings; appointment discretionary. | Court: No abuse of discretion in refusing counsel under these circumstances. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Martin, 974 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2020) (Fair Sentencing Act did not apply retroactively before First Step Act)
- United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020) (describes two-step First Step Act framework and discretionary nature of reductions)
- United States v. Moyhernandez, 5 F.4th 195 (2d Cir. 2021) (district courts not required to apply § 3553(a) in every First Step Act case)
- United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660 (2d Cir. 2020) (First Step Act motions treated as governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B))
- United States v. Fleming, 5 F.4th 189 (2d Cir. 2021) (no statutory right to counsel in § 3582(c) proceedings)
- United States v. Reddick, 53 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 1995) (no entitlement to appointed counsel in § 3582 proceedings)