United States v. Mayo, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11715

Mayo pleaded guilty to traveling in interstate commerce to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor.
District court sentenced Mayo to 46 months' imprisonment and 15 years' supervised release with special conditions restricting pornography, computer access, and Internet use.
Special conditions at issue are: (4) ban on pornography; (6) prohibition on possessing or accessing a computer or computer-enabling equipment; (7) Internet access restriction if employment requires computer use.
The district court's oral sentence for condition 7 conflicted with the written judgment; Mayo failed to timely object to the conditions, triggering plain-error review.
On appeal, Mayo challenges the validity and tailoring of the three special conditions; the court addresses each under § 3583(d) and related precedents.
The panel affirms conditions 4 and 7, vacates condition 6, and remands for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are special conditions 4, 6, and 7 properly tailored under § 3583(d)?	Mayo argues 4 and 6 are not reasonably related or overly broad.	Government asserts conditions are related to the offense and protection/deterrence goals.	Special condition 4 upheld; 6 vacated and remanded; 7 upheld as controlled by oral sentence.
Is special condition 6 plain error due to ambiguity and lack of individualized findings?	Mayo contends the ban is overbroad and not narrowly tailored.	Government contends prohibition aided deterrence and public protection.	Vacated; remanded for individualized findings and reimposition if appropriate.
Does the oral sentence control when conflicting with the written judgment for condition 7?	Not explicitly argued separately.	Oral sentence controls under Foster.	Condition 7 upheld as described orally; not plain error.
Is the scope of “computer-enabling equipment” sufficiently defined?	Ambiguity in whether the ban covers more than traditional computers.	Court may uphold under precedent; scope implied.	Ambiguity; remand to clarify and tailor if imposed.

U.S. v. Curry, 627 F.3d 312 (8th Cir. 2010) (plain error in porn ban where offense did not relate to pornography)
U.S. v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 2007) (broad discretion to condition supervised release)
U.S. v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2009) (pornography ban not plain error based on offense)
U.S. v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692 (8th Cir. 2003) (conditions must be tailored and justified)
U.S. v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2009) (need for individualized findings)
U.S. v. Fields, 324 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2003) (computer prohibition not plain error when offense involved more than possession)
U.S. v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2011) (broad definition of ‘computer’ under statute)
U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (U.S. 1993) (plain-error standard)
U.S. v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2005) (protects constitutional rights under broad discretion)
U.S. v. Foster, No. 07-00000 (8th Cir. 2008) (oral sentence controls when conflicting with judgment)