United States v. Max Wright
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14543
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Wright was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin, cocaine base, and fentanyl (alleged to have caused six serious bodily injuries and two deaths) and two counts of distributing fentanyl; if convicted he faced a mandatory life term due to a §851 notice of prior felony drug convictions.
- The district court admitted one of Wright’s prior felony drug convictions (2008 cocaine manufacture/delivery) under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) for intent/knowledge/absence of mistake and gave a limiting instruction; two other prior convictions were excluded.
- Government cooperator DeShaun Anderson (also charged) testified that Wright directed a drug-distribution conspiracy; Anderson pled guilty and cooperated in exchange for the government declining to file a §851 enhancement against him.
- Defense cross-examination of Anderson was limited: the court prevented counsel from mentioning Anderson would face a mandatory life sentence (to avoid signaling that Wright faced the same), permitting only a substitute phrase ("decades"/"mandatory minimum that could cost him decades") suggested by defense counsel.
- After closing, the government disclosed that four customer-witnesses had prior cooperation with law enforcement (and one had been paid $20 for an attempted purchase), facts not disclosed pretrial; Wright moved for a new trial under Brady and also challenged the 404(b) ruling and the cross-examination limitation.
- The jury convicted on all counts and the district court denied Wright’s motion for a new trial; on appeal the Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Wright’s challenges to the 404(b) admission, Confrontation Clause/cross-examination limitation, and Brady claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior conviction under Rule 404(b) | Admission was unnecessary and unfairly prejudicial because Wright contested only conspiracy and had conceded knowledge of drug sales | Prior drug-distribution conviction is relevant to intent/knowledge/absence of mistake in a drug-conspiracy prosecution; limiting instruction mitigates prejudice | Affirmed — district court did not abuse discretion admitting the 2008 conviction for limited purpose |
| Limitation on cross-examination about witness’s potential life sentence (Confrontation Clause) | Prohibiting explicit reference to a mandatory life sentence prevented full impeachment of cooperating witness bias; mandatory life is uniquely important | Court reasonably limited questioning to avoid informing jury of Wright’s own sentence; substitute language conveyed severity and did not materially change credibility assessment | Affirmed — no abuse of discretion and no Confrontation Clause violation (no prejudice) |
| Brady failure to disclose witnesses’ prior cooperation/payments | Suppressed impeachment evidence about four customer-witnesses was favorable and material; warrants new trial | Government concedes suppression but argues evidence was not material given corroboration and other overwhelming evidence (especially Anderson) | Affirmed — suppressed impeachment not material; disclosure would not have reasonably affected outcome |
| Materiality impact on sentencing exposure argument | Suppressed evidence could have led jury to disbelieve key witnesses and thus change findings about quantities/overdoses, affecting sentencing exposure | Even assuming reduced findings on heroin quantity/overdoses, §841(b)(1)(C) and jury findings of deaths/serious injuries still would have exposed Wright to life given prior felony convictions | Affirmed — even with reduced proof on some counts, life sentence exposure remained; no reasonable probability of different result |
Key Cases Cited
- Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (rule that stipulation does not always bar admission of past crimes under Rule 404(b))
- United States v. Young, 753 F.3d 757 (8th Cir. 2014) (standards for admissibility of other-act evidence under Rule 404(b))
- United States v. Robinson, 639 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2011) (prior drug-distribution convictions relevant to intent/knowledge in drug-conspiracy cases)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (scope of Confrontation Clause and limits on cross-examination for bias)
- United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. en banc) (witness’s facing mandatory life sentence—impeachment value; contrasted treatment)
- United States v. Walley, 567 F.3d 354 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding limitation that permitted describing potential sentence only vaguely)
- United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473 (8th Cir. 1998) (Brady materiality requires reasonable probability of different outcome)