United States v. Maury
695 F.3d 227
| 3rd Cir. | 2012Background
- Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co. operated a Phillipsburg, NJ plant near the Delaware River; executives Prisque, Maury, Davidson, Faubert, and the Company were charged after a trial for environmental and worker-safety violations under CWA, CAA, and OSHA, including illicit discharges and burning of paint waste in a cupola.
- Evidence showed repeated discharges from the Number Four Pit and Cement Pit via storm drains to the Delaware River, and improper handling of wastewater and cement pit contents.
- Defendants were also charged with lying to investigators and obstructing OSHA/EPA enforcement; a conspiracy count under 18 U.S.C. § 371 accompanied multiple substantive offenses.
- Trial produced numerous OSHA incidents and management attempts to conceal safety deficiencies and injuries (e.g., Coxe fatality, Marchan injury, Velarde accident).
- Jury convicted most defendants of felony CWA/CAA violations and conspiracy, while several individuals were convicted of negligent CWA violations; the Company faced substantial penalties under the Alternative Fines Act (AFA).
- On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting most pre-trial discovery and trial-management challenges and upholding the jury instructions and the handling of mutually exclusive verdicts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rule 16(a)(1)(C) scope for corporate defendants | Company seeks broader discovery under Rule 16(a)(1)(C)(ii) for all statements of participating employees | Government redacted statements; Rule 16(a)(1)(C)(ii) should cover all statements by participants, not only those tied to specific conduct | Rule 16(a)(1)(C)(ii) limited to binding statements tied to conduct; discovery not plainly in error |
| CWA negligence standard for misdemeanor vs. felony | Hanousek should define negligence as simple, not gross, negligence | Invited-error doctrine bars challenge; if not, plain error shows no clear mistake | Invited-error doctrine applies; simple negligence standard upheld for misdemeanor; no plain error by District Court |
| Recklessness instruction vs. knowing conduct | Recklessness should be defined to clarify not-knowingly conduct | Court should include recklessness to distinguish between negligence and knowing conduct | District Court did not err in omitting recklessness; instructions adequately distinguished knowing/intentional conduct |
| Mutually exclusive verdicts (conspiracy vs. underlying offenses) | Convictions should be vacated if verdicts are mutually exclusive | Powell rationale permits concurrent convictions where underlying counts do not negate conspiracy | No reversible inconsistency; conspiracy convictions affirmed despite some underlying acquittals |
Key Cases Cited
- Hanousek v. United States, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) (negligence standard for CWA §1319(c)(1) is ordinary negligence)
- Ortiz v. United States, 427 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2005) (plain meaning supports ordinary negligence for §1319(c)(1))
- Pruett v. United States, 681 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2012) (recites plain negligence interpretation for §1319(c)(1) and discusses Safeco context)
- Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007) (willful is context-dependent; civil vs. criminal meanings differ)
- Powell v. United States, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (mutually exclusive verdicts discussion for conspiracy vs. underlying offense)
- United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1992) (dueling guilty verdicts and Powell-like analysis in multi-count cases)