United States v. Matthew Otis Charles, 901 F.3d 702

Matthew Charles was convicted in 1996 of drug and weapons offenses and sentenced to 35 years based on a judicial finding of drug quantity.
After unsuccessful collateral attacks, Charles moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a sentence reduction following the Sentencing Commission’s crack-cocaine guideline amendment and received a reduced term of 24 years, 4 months.
The government appealed; this court held Charles was a career offender and thus ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief, reversed, and remanded "for purposes of entering an order that rejects Charles’ § 3582(c)(2) motion." United States v. Charles, 843 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 2016).
On remand the district court reimposed the original 35-year sentence; Charles appealed, arguing the remand allowed a full resentencing to correct an allegedly illegal sentence under intervening constitutional decisions.
The panel affirmed: the remand was limited to denying the § 3582(c)(2) motion, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize plenary resentencing, and Apprendi/Alleyne are not retroactive to permit relief from this final sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Scope of remand	Charles: remand opened the door to correct an illegal original sentence via resentencing	Gov: remand was limited to entry of order rejecting § 3582(c)(2) motion	Court: remand was limited; district court properly denied § 3582(c)(2) motion and reimposed original sentence
Whether § 3582(c)(2) permits full resentencing	Charles: § 3582(c)(2) and § 3553 considerations require reconsideration of sentence options	Gov: § 3582(c)(2) is a narrow exception allowing only limited reductions under amended guidelines	Court: § 3582(c)(2) allows only limited reduction, not plenary resentencing
Retroactivity of Apprendi/Alleyne to attack final sentence	Charles: intervening Apprendi/Alleyne render the original sentence illegal and justify resentencing	Gov: Apprendi/Alleyne are constitutional rules that are not retroactive to final sentences	Court: Apprendi/Alleyne do not apply retroactively here; they do not permit relief from this final sentence
Authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 or § 3742(g) to fashion relief on remand	Charles: § 3742(g) and § 2106 allow courts to correct illegal sentences and remand for refashioning	Gov: Those provisions do not override the limited remand and finality principles absent concession or clear illegality	Court: Neither statute required or authorized a full resentencing here; no conceded illegality justified broader relief

United States v. Charles, 843 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 2016) (prior panel decision holding Charles ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief and directing entry of an order rejecting the motion)
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (§ 3582(c)(2) remedies are limited and do not permit plenary resentencing)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts that increase maximum penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (extends Apprendi to facts that increase mandatory minimums)
United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2014) (defendant in § 3582 proceeding may not rely on subsequent legal changes to obtain broader relief)
United States v. Campbell, 168 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1999) (district court must respect the scope of a remand)
In re Mazzio, 756 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2014) (Alleyne is not retroactive)
Goode v. United States, 305 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2002) (Apprendi is not retroactive)
United States v. Dado, 759 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2014) (characterizes Alleyne as constitutional rule applicable prospectively to jury findings of drug quantity)
United States v. Burd, 86 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 1996) (limited example where court vacated and refashioned an illegal original sentence on remand when government conceded illegality)