United States v. Matthew G. Munksgard, 913 F.3d 1327

Matthew Munksgard, a land surveyor, submitted four fraudulent loan applications to Drummond Community Bank (2013–2014), each supported by forged surveying contracts and signatures; he admitted forging one signature (Kyle Morris).
Drummond is a small regional bank; after unpaid loans, FBI investigation led to indictment.
Indictment: four counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements to obtain loans from an FDIC‑insured institution) and one count of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A for forging Morris’s signature.
Government’s proof of FDIC insurance at the time of the offenses consisted of: a 1990 FDIC certificate at chartering, testimony from a long‑time bank officer that the bank was insured in 2016, and that the FDIC certificate is not renewed “every so often.”
Jury convicted on all counts; district court sentenced six months for the fraud counts and a consecutive 24 months for aggravated identity theft.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence that Drummond was FDIC‑insured when offenses occurred (§ 1014 jurisdictional element)	Govt: prior certificate (1990) + later testimony (2016) + witness statement about non‑renewal suffice when viewed in light most favorable to verdict	Munksgard: evidence was too thin and remote in time; govt failed to prove insurance beyond reasonable doubt	Court: Affirmed — prior + subsequent evidence plus witness testimony and the ordinary inference that banks remain insured was enough for a reasonable juror to find FDIC coverage at offense dates
Meaning of "uses" a "means of identification" in § 1028A(a)(1)	Govt: "use" means to employ or convert an identification into one’s service; forging a signature to obtain a benefit qualifies	Munksgard: "use" requires impersonation or acting on behalf of the identified person; mere signature forgery without impersonation is insufficient	Court: Affirmed — "use" includes employing another’s name (signature) to further fraud; statutory text, context, dictionaries, and precedent support a broad meaning beyond impersonation

Cook v. United States, 320 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1963) (endorsing Wigmore’s inference that prior or subsequent existence can be evidence of existence at the time in issue)
United States v. Maner, 611 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding prior evidence of FDIC insurance may support jury inference of continued coverage; admonished govt to do better)
United States v. Platenburg, 657 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing where only stale FDIC certificate predating offense by years was offered)
United States v. Fitzpatrick, 581 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1978) (observing jury may infer insurance from proof before and after offense; district‑court error analysis)
United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2010) (standard for viewing sufficiency of the evidence on appeal — evidence construed in light most favorable to govt)
United States v. Michael, 882 F.3d 624 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that including identifiers on fraudulent claims constituted "use" of means of identification though not impersonation)
United States v. Miller, 734 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2013) (discussing scope of "use" in § 1028A)
United States v. Berroa, 856 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 2017) (advancing an impersonation‑focused interpretation of "use")
United States v. Montano, 398 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (construing statutory "use" to mean employing an object to derive benefit)
United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (interpreting "use" to mean making an object the user’s instrument)