United States v. Massenburg
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849
| 4th Cir. | 2011Background
- Anonymous tip reported shots fired in a high-crime area and officers encountered four young men, including Massenburg, four blocks from the reported gunfire location.
- Officers approached in a marked car, asked for names, and sought voluntary pat-downs; three consented, Massenburg refused.
- Gaines conducted a nonconsensual frisk after Massenburg resisted and failed to initially consent; a firearm and marijuana were recovered.
- District court denied suppression of the firearm and marijuana; Massenburg entered a conditional guilty plea reserving rights on appeal.
- Massenburg challenges the stop and frisk as unlawful under the Fourth Amendment, arguing lack of reasonable suspicion; the court reviews de novo the legal conclusions and clearly the factual findings.
- The Fourth Circuit vacates the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and remands for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gaines had reasonable suspicion to justify a nonconsensual frisk | Massenburg lacked sufficient particularized suspicion | State relied on generic characteristics and tip, not per-person specifics | No reasonable suspicion; suppression reversed |
| Whether nervous behavior from Massenburg justifies stop or frisk | Nervousness from refusal to consent constitutes suspicion | Nervousness is insufficient without more | Nervous behavior alone is insufficient; cannot justify a stop or frisk |
| Whether the collective-knowledge doctrine imputed Fries’s observation to Gaines | Collective-knowledge doctrine could justify the frisk | No, information wasn’t communicated; aggregation not allowed | Rejected; Gaines lacked reasonable suspicion; suppression required |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (U.S. 2000) (anonymous-tip reliability required corroboration for reasonable suspicion)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (establishes stop-and-frisk standard with reasonable suspicion)
- Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (U.S. 1980) (reasonable suspicion required for stop; factors must be particularized)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2000) (presence in high-crime area alone not enough for suspicion)
- Florida v. Bostock, 501 U.S. 429 (U.S. 1991) (refusal to cooperate alone not sufficient for stop)
- Hensley v. Commonwealth, 469 U.S. 221 (U.S. 1985) (collective-knowledge doctrine limits to communicated information)
- Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (U.S. 2011) (exclusionary rule deterrence rationale; good-faith preservation)
- United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2011) (warning against treating mundane acts as suspicious)
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (U.S. 1981) (need for specificity in information for reasonable suspicion)