United States v. Mason Shepherd, 922 F.3d 753

Defendant Mason Shepherd pleaded guilty to receipt/distribution of child pornography and was sentenced to 96 months incarceration, 6 years supervised release, $25,000 restitution, $100 special assessment, and a $5,000 JVTA assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 3014.
The Presentence Report showed minimal assets (1996 Dodge Ram ~ $200), negative net worth (~ -$1,739), prior part‑time and full‑time low‑wage employment, GED and EMT/fire safety certifications, and unpaid medical bills.
At sentencing defense counsel argued Shepherd was indigent given current finances, limited education, sex‑offender registration, low prison wages, and ~$55,000 projected liabilities (restitution + future child support).
The district court imposed the $5,000 JVTA assessment, stating the defendant’s future earning capacity made the assessment manageable; defense preserved an objection and appealed the JVTA assessment.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed (1) de novo the legal meaning of “indigent” under §3014, and (2) for clear error the district court’s factual finding that Shepherd is non‑indigent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Shepherd)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
1) Whether courts may consider future earning capacity when determining "indigent" under §3014	Indigency should be judged by present financial condition only	Courts may consider both present ability to pay and future earnings potential	Court held statute permits consideration of both present condition and future earnings potential when assessing indigency under §3014
2) Whether Shepherd was indigent as a factual matter	Shepherd lacked means now, has limited education, will be a registered sex offender, and faces large restitution/child‑support obligations, so he is indigent	Shepherd has vocational training, is relatively young with substantial post‑release earning horizon, and has 20 years to pay the assessment	Court held district court did not clearly err: Shepherd is non‑indigent and $5,000 assessment proper
3) Whether district court had to make an explicit on‑the‑record indigency finding	Court must make an explicit finding that defendant is non‑indigent	No explicit formula required; record must show the court considered arguments and evidence	Court held no explicit label required so long as record shows the court considered the issue and imposed the assessment after hearing arguments

United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1997) (general principle that fines are reviewed for abuse of discretion)
United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2003) (clear‑error standard for factual findings at sentencing)
United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1997) (standard for overturning factual findings)
Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (de novo review of legal questions at sentencing)
Keeley v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2018) (use of ordinary meaning and dictionary aids in statutory interpretation)
United States v. Grant, 636 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2011) (ordinary‑meaning approach to undefined statutory terms)
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (use of contemporaneous dictionaries to ascertain ordinary meaning)
United States v. Zabawa, 719 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2013) (dictionary use in statutory interpretation)
United States v. Graves, 908 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2018) (circuit precedent allowing consideration of future earnings in §3014 indigency analysis)
United States v. Kelley, 861 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2017) (similar treatment of indigency and consideration of assets/earning capacity)
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (record sufficiency and deference to sentencing explanations)