United States v. Marrero
2012 WL 1416090
3rd Cir.2012Background
- Marrero pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
- PSR classified Marrero as a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1 due to three prior convictions for crimes of violence: third-degree murder (1997), simple assault (2004), and the bank robberies in this case.
- Third-degree murder under Pennsylvania law involved malice and an unlawful killing without specific intent to kill.
- Simple assault under Pennsylvania law includes intentional/knowing or reckless/intent-to-injure variants; Marrero admitted to neck-hold/kidnapping-like conduct in plea colloquy.
- District Court held both prior convictions were crimes of violence, applying cases like Johnson and relying on Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2; Marrero received a below-guidelines sentence after a substantial variance.
- Marrero appeals challenging the career-offender classification and its effect on his sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does simple assault qualify as a crime of violence? | Marrero argues simple assault cannot be a crime of violence under the residual clause. | State law and plea record show intentional/knowing simple assault; argues it is a crime of violence. | Yes; simple assault qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause when the record shows intentional/knowing conduct. |
| Does third-degree murder qualify as a crime of violence? | Marrero contends third-degree murder may not meet the generic 'murder' definition. | Third-degree murder falls within enumerated murder under Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. | Yes; third-degree murder qualifies as murder for purposes of § 4B1.2, forming a crime of violence. |
| What is the proper method to classify a prior conviction as a crime of violence when enumerated offenses are involved? | Begay limits residual-clause inquiries; cannot rely on reckless aspects. | Taylor requires a generic definition and a comparing analysis to determine if the prior offense matches the generic crime. | Proper to apply Taylor's enumerated-offense approach using a generic definition and compare to the defendant's conviction. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (limits crime-of-violence status to intentional/knowingly committed simple assault)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court 2008) (limits residual clause to similar, purposeful crimes)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (Supreme Court 1990) (establishes generic definitions for enumerated offenses in misspecified statutes)
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (Supreme Court 2009) (explains use of Shepard documents to determine underlying conviction character)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (Supreme Court 2005) (authorization to use court records to determine elements of prior offenses)
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (Supreme Court 1993) (treatise-derived guidelines are authoritative unless irrational)
- United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723 (3d Cir. 1996) (enumerated offense rule for aggravated assault under notes to § 4B1.2)
- United States v. McClenton, 53 F.3d 584 (3d Cir. 1995) (burglary of a dwelling as enumerated offense under § 4B1.2)
- United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2011) (enumerated offenses include robbery under § 4B1.2)
- United States v. Peterson, 629 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2011) (treats murder/manslaughter within enumerated offenses context)
- United States v. Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d 663 (10th Cir. 2010) (Taylor framework for enumerated offenses in the Guidelines)