United States v. Marquis Leval Cotton
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5459
| 8th Cir. | 2015Background
- Officers Kocher and Suchta, in uniform on a paid private detail patrolling an apartment complex in a high-crime area, observed someone toss keys from a third-floor balcony to two men below (Cotton and an unidentified male).
- The property manager had posted a rule prohibiting residents from throwing keys off balconies for security reasons; officers were aware of this rule.
- After the keys hit the ground, officers told the men not to take the keys; the unidentified male grabbed them, moved quickly toward a back door, ignored commands to stop, unlocked and entered the building; Cotton remained near the doorway and appeared nervous.
- As Officer Suchta approached Cotton, Suchta observed Cotton reach toward his waistband, grabbed Cotton, and handcuffed him; Officer Kocher conducted a pat-down and felt a pistol in Cotton’s waistband.
- Cotton moved to suppress the firearm evidence as the fruit of an unconstitutional stop and frisk; the district court denied the motion, Cotton pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Cotton's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion | Stop lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion | Either Fourth Amendment not implicated or officers had reasonable suspicion based on totality of circumstances | Terry stop was supported by reasonable suspicion (affirmed) |
| Whether officers reasonably could treat Cotton and the other man as companions | They were not companions; relying on that characterization was error | Officers reasonably could perceive them as companions given proximity and role as recipients of keys | Court found appearance of companionship reasonable; officers’ reasonable mistake still supports suspicion |
| Whether frisk/ protective search was justified (safety) | Frisk was not supported; no articulable facts Cotton was armed and dangerous | Cotton’s waistband motion, nervousness, high-crime location gave reasonable suspicion he was armed | Terry frisk was supported by reasonable suspicion that Cotton was armed and dangerous (affirmed) |
| Whether district court erred in denying motion to reconsider | District court adopted a new, unfounded analysis re: companionship and deprived Cotton of opportunity to respond | Magistrate’s R&R and district court consistently characterized them as companions; Cotton could have objected earlier | Denial of motion to reconsider was not erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes stop-and-frisk rule)
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (reasonable-suspicion analysis considers totality of circumstances objectively)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (Terry permits stops based on ambiguous, evasive conduct in high-crime areas)
- United States v. Barker, 437 F.3d 787 (8th Cir. 2006) (series of innocent actions may cumulatively support reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Johnson, 326 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) (reasonable but mistaken belief can justify an investigative stop)
- United States v. Ellis, 501 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2007) (protective frisk requires specific articulable facts suggesting the person is armed and dangerous)
- United States v. Davis, 202 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2000) (nervous movements in high-crime area can support a frisk)
- United States v. Clark, 409 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 1998) (nervousness considered in totality-of-circumstances analysis)