United States v. Marquez
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23359
| 5th Cir. | 2010Background
- Marquez pled guilty to possessing more than 100 kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute.
- The presentence report recommended career-offender treatment under § 4B1.1 based on two prior New Mexico convictions: cocaine distribution and deadly-weapon-by-prisoner.
- The NM conviction at issue is for possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner, a second-degree felony under NM law.
- The weapon at issue was a club fashioned from rolled, dried, hardened paper (magazine), found in Marquez's prison cell.
- The district court applied the career-offender enhancement, rejecting Marquez's objection that the NM weapon-possession offense is not a crime of violence under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2).
- The court sentenced Marquez to 188 months, within the career-offender advisory range, and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NM prison weapon possession qualifies as a crime of violence | Marquez argues it is not a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2). | Marquez's opponent asserts it is a crime of violence under the residual clause. | Yes; the conviction constitutes a crime of violence. |
| Applicability of Begay/Chambers framework to inmate weapon possession | Begay and Chambers require purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct; possession alone is passive. | The offense reflects a serious risk and is similar in kind to burglary/other listed crimes. | The court held the possession offense satisfies the residual-clause test as a crime of violence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court, 2008) (requires purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct for a crime to be a 'violent felony')
- Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (Supreme Court, 2009) (clarifies Begay's framework for 'violent felony' analysis under ACCA/4B1.2)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (Supreme Court, 2007) (illustrates face-to-face confrontation risk concept in burglary-like reasoning)
- United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2009) (post-Begay analysis of possession in prison; contested 'in kind' similarity)
- United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330 (10th Cir. 2009) (possession of deadly weapon in prison deemed violent under ACCA residual clause)
- United States v. Hughes, 602 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2010) (applies Begay framework to § 4B1.2 through ACCA analogy)
- Templeton v. United States, 543 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 2008) (distinguishes escape from burglary under Begay’s 'in kind' analysis)
- Mohr v. United States, 554 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 2009) (explains residual-clause analysis under Begay/Chambers)