United States v. Marquete Murray
897 F.3d 298
| D.C. Cir. | 2018Background
- Murray pled guilty in federal court to a narcotics conspiracy pursuant to a plea agreement that estimated an applicable Sentencing Guidelines range of 24–30 months (Offense Level 17; Criminal History Category I), and required Murray to plead separately in two D.C. Superior Court matters.
- The plea agreement stated the estimates were based on information "now available" and warned that additional convictions discovered during the PSR could increase criminal history points; it also reserved both parties’ right to seek a sentence outside the estimated range based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
- Murray thereafter entered the two Superior Court pleas before his federal sentencing; the Probation Office counted those un‑sentenced pleas as two criminal history points, raising his Category to II and the Guidelines range to 27–33 months.
- At sentencing the government recommended 33 months (the top of the 27–33 range); defense counsel did not object to the calculation or to the government’s recommendation and did not request that the Superior Court pleas be delayed.
- The district court adopted the 27–33 range and sentenced Murray to 33 months. On appeal Murray argued the government breached the plea agreement and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object or secure favorable sequencing; the D.C. Circuit found a breach but no plain‑error relief and remanded for an ineffective‑assistance hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the gov’t breached the plea agreement by scheduling Superior Court pleas before federal sentencing so they counted in criminal history | Murray: estimated 24–30 range reflected final range absent new info; upcoming Superior Court pleas were known and should not have been counted | Gov’t: agreement warned estimates could change and required Murray to perform pleas as condition; reservation permits sequencing that changes range | Breach: Court says best reading supports Murray (gov’t breached), but breach not "plain" so no relief on plain‑error review |
| Whether the gov’t breached by recommending a 33‑month sentence above the plea’s estimated ceiling | Murray: recommending 33 months without seeking an upward variance breached the parties’ reasonable expectation | Gov’t: plea reserved right to seek above‑range sentence based on §3553(a); recommending within calculated range was permissible | Breach: Court views gov’t recommendation as breach under best reading, but again not plain; no relief on plain‑error review |
| Whether Murray’s failure to object in district court forecloses relief (plain‑error standard) | Murray: breaches were clear and affected his substantial rights | Gov’t: estimates and reservation language made changes foreseeable; breaches not obvious | Held: Plain‑error not met — breaches were not "clear or obvious" given ambiguities and factual uncertainty about scheduling authority |
| Whether defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not objecting or securing different sequencing | Murray: counsel’s failure to seek delay or to object at sentencing was deficient and likely prejudiced him (could have produced lower sentence) | Gov’t: sentencing court knew history and likely would still impose 33 months; no reasonable probability of different result | Held: Murray presented a colorable Strickland claim of deficiency and prejudice; remand for an evidentiary hearing is required |
Key Cases Cited
- Henry v. United States, 758 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (plea agreement interpretation construed against the government)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plain‑error review for forfeited objections at sentencing)
- King‑Gore v. United States, 875 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (plain‑error application in sentencing context)
- Rashad v. United States, 331 F.3d 908 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (remanding ineffective‑assistance claims first raised on appeal for evidentiary hearing if colorable)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (incorrect Guidelines range can be a basis for a showing of prejudice)
- Brown v. United States, 857 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (requirements for justifying an upward variance)
- Abney v. United States, 812 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (counsel may be deficient for failing to seek delay in sentencing when benefits are reasonably likely)
- Palladino v. United States, 347 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2003) (interpreting estimated Guidelines language to limit government from seeking enhancements absent new information)
- Canada v. United States, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 1992) (government cannot evade plea assurances by end‑runs around them)