United States v. Markell Hamilton, 950 F.3d 567

In 2017 Markell Hamilton pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin and was sentenced to 81 months; his PSR counted a prior Illinois aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) felony in his criminal history.
This court previously vacated Hamilton’s sentence and remanded for resentencing because part of the Illinois AUUW statute had been held unconstitutional, requiring the district court to determine whether Hamilton’s conviction rested on a now-invalid subsection. United States v. Hamilton, 709 F. App’x 425 (8th Cir. 2018).
At resentencing the district court limited the proceeding to the single question whether the Illinois conviction could be counted, found the conviction rested on valid subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3)(C), and reimposed the same 81-month sentence.
Hamilton appealed again, arguing (1) the district court relied on documents that did not satisfy Shepard v. United States when determining the basis of the prior conviction, and (2) the district court improperly limited the scope of resentencing.
The panel held the Shepard challenge failed because the Information and Order Assessing Fines, Fees and Costs identified the subsections under which Hamilton was charged, but concluded the district court erred by thinking it was barred from addressing other sentencing issues on remand; the sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by relying on state-court documents that allegedly fail Shepard to establish the subsection of the AUUW conviction	Hamilton: The Information and order lack factual colloquy or explicit subsection and thus do not meet Shepard’s limits on what may be used to identify the basis of a plea	Government: The Information and Order identify the charged subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3)(C), which narrows the statute and satisfies Shepard so no further records were required	Held: No error — the charging document and order sufficiently identified the subsections; Shepard did not require additional records
Whether the district court was limited on remand to considering only the Illinois-conviction issue and could not revisit other sentencing matters	Hamilton: The district court could address other sentencing issues (relevant conduct, upward departure/variance) on remand unless the appellate mandate explicitly limited the remand	Government: Remand should be limited to the AUUW-conviction issue as directed by the prior opinion	Held: Error — the district court mistakenly believed it was prohibited from reconsidering other sentencing issues; vacatur and full resentencing consistent with the opinion required

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits the records a sentencing court may consult to determine the factual basis of a prior plea)
United States v. Vasquez-Garcia, 449 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2006) (charging documents that narrow an overbroad statute can satisfy Shepard)
United States v. Townsend, 408 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2005) (standards of review for Guidelines Chapter Four and criminal-history calculations)
United States v. Moody, 930 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 2019) (remand for resentencing: district court’s unawareness of its authority warrants remand)
United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 1999) (on remand a district court may hear relevant evidence not limited by the appellate court’s mandate)
United States v. Walterman, 408 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2005) (if remand is limited to specific issues, matters outside the scope are generally not available)
United States v. Dunlap, 452 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 2006) (when appellate court vacates sentence without limiting remand, district court may hear any relevant evidence it could have at the original sentencing)