United States v. Mark Pulsifer, 39 F.4th 1018

Mark Pulsifer pleaded guilty to distributing ≥50 grams of methamphetamine; because of a prior serious drug felony the statutory minimum was 15 years under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).
Pulsifer argued he was eligible for sentencing under the Guidelines “without regard to” the statutory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), as amended by the First Step Act.
The key contested provision was § 3553(f)(1), which states the defendant "does not have— (A) ... (B) ... and (C) ..." referring to certain criminal-history point conditions as "determined under the sentencing guidelines."
The district court found Pulsifer ineligible under § 3553(f)(1) and sentenced him to 162 months after a separate reduction; Pulsifer appealed the statutory-interpretation ruling.
The court interpreted "prior offense" language to track the Guidelines’ determination of criminal-history points (based on prior sentences per USSG § 4A1.1) and read the conjunction in § 3553(f)(1) distributively, making Pulsifer ineligible because he has >4 points and a prior 3‑point offense.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does § 3553(f)(1)’s phrase "does not have (A), (B), and (C)" require a defendant to lack all three items to be eligible, or only to lack at least one?	Pulsifer: read "and" jointly; because he lacks the (C) 2-point violent offense, he is eligible.	Government: read "and" distributively; a defendant is ineligible if he meets any listed disqualifying condition (A or B or C).	The court adopted a distributive reading: a defendant must lack each listed condition to qualify; because Pulsifer meets (A) and (B), he is ineligible.
Does the statutory reference to prior "offenses" mean a separate statutory concept, or does it incorporate the Guidelines’ criminal-history point determinations (based on prior sentences)?	Pulsifer (implicitly disputed creating a new concept)	Government: the statute uses shorthand and incorporates Guidelines’ determinations tied to prior sentences (USSG §4A1.1).	The court held "prior offense" refers to the Guidelines’ criminal-history point framework (i.e., prior sentences as defined in USSG §4A1.1).

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (avoid surplusage and give effect to every clause)
IPB, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) (presumption of consistent usage within a statute)
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) (consistent-usage presumption yields to context)
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (rule of lenity applies only when grievous ambiguity remains)
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991) (interpretive tools must be exhausted before invoking lenity)
United States v. Lopez, 998 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 2021) (contrasting Ninth Circuit interpretation of § 3553(f)(1))
United States v. Maupin, 3 F.4th 1009 (8th Cir. 2021) (discussing conjunctive application of § 3553(f) criteria)