United States v. Mark McGill, 8f4th617

McGill is a convicted child-pornography offender on supervised release with conditions forbidding contact with minors, possession of sexually stimulating materials (including electronic media), permitting probation visits and confiscation of contraband, and consenting to computer monitoring.
He had prior supervision violations: in 2015 his monitored phone showed sexually stimulating material and he failed two polygraphs about contact with minors.
On Feb. 3, 2017, PO Hence Williams visited McGill’s home, observed an unmonitored white cell phone in plain view, and testified McGill tried to shield it, gave an implausible explanation, changed demeanor, and admitted the phone contained child pornography (McGill disputes parts of this account).
Williams powered on or inspected the phone, saw a young boy’s photo on the wallpaper, took the phone without a warrant, and turned it over to the FBI. A later warrant-based search revealed thousands of child-pornography images.
McGill moved to suppress; the district court denied suppression on four independent grounds (plain view, reasonable suspicion, inevitable discovery, good faith). McGill pleaded guilty conditionally and appealed the suppression denial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the warrantless seizure lawful under the plain‑view doctrine?	McGill: phone’s incriminating nature was not immediately apparent; seizure unlawful.	Williams: given conditions, prior violations, behavior, and wallpaper image, the phone was immediately incriminating.	Court: plain‑view satisfied; seizure lawful.
Was the seizure supported by reasonable suspicion given McGill’s probation status?	McGill: no particularized basis to seize the phone.	Williams: probationer status plus prior violations, suspicious conduct, and an internet‑capable unmonitored phone gave reasonable suspicion.	Court: reasonable suspicion existed under probation standard; seizure lawful.
If seizure was unlawful, should evidence be suppressed under inevitable‑discovery?	McGill: suppression required as fruit of unlawful seizure.	Government: information available to Williams (admission, observations) made a warrant and lawful seizure inevitable.	Court: inevitable‑discovery applies; evidence admissible.
If seizure was unlawful, does officer’s good faith preclude suppression?	McGill: exclusion still appropriate.	Government: Williams acted with objectively reasonable belief that seizure was lawful.	Court: officer acted in good faith; exclusionary rule inapplicable.

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (warrant requirement subject to reasonable exceptions)
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (warrantless entries/searches presumptively unreasonable but exceptions exist)
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (lower Fourth Amendment standard for probationers; reasonable suspicion may suffice)
United States v. Raney, 342 F.3d 551 (plain‑view elements)
United States v. Cellitti, 387 F.3d 618 (item incriminating if probable cause it’s contraband or linked to crime)
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (definition of seizure: meaningful interference with possessory interest)
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (inevitable‑discovery doctrine)
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (exclusionary rule applies only when deterrence benefits outweigh costs)
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (good‑faith exception where officers reasonably rely on law)
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (deterrence costs vs. benefits in exclusionary rule analysis)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good‑faith exception to exclusionary rule)