United States v. Mark Johnson
16-2033
| 6th Cir. | Nov 22, 2017Background
- In Sept. 2015 Mark Johnson, a felon, was found with a loaded gun, pointed it at police, fled, and later pleaded guilty to felon-in-possession.
- At sentencing (July 12, 2016) the district court considered whether three prior Michigan convictions were "crimes of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2: a 2003 armed-robbery conviction (M.C.L. § 750.529), a 2010 assaulting/resisting an officer causing injury conviction, and a 2010 fleeing-and-eluding conviction.
- The district court (applying the law as it understood it then) concluded only the 2003 armed-robbery conviction qualified under the Guidelines’ elements clause and enhanced Johnson’s base offense level; it ultimately sentenced Johnson to 63 months.
- Timing was critical: sentencing occurred after the Sixth Circuit’s Pawlak decision (which invalidated the Guidelines’ residual clause) but before the Sentencing Commission removed that clause; while the appeal was pending the Supreme Court decided Beckles, holding Guidelines vagueness challenges inapplicable.
- The government argued (post-Beckles) that, even if the elements clause did not apply, Johnson’s Michigan armed-robbery conviction categorically qualified as a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ residual clause; the Sixth Circuit relied on its earlier Tibbs decision (which upheld that conclusion) to affirm.
Issues
| Issue | Johnson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson’s Michigan armed-robbery conviction is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 | Payne and Tibbs are wrong; Michigan armed robbery does not categorically present a serious potential risk of physical injury (categorical approach requires examining the least culpable conduct). | Beckles permits reliance on the Guidelines’ residual clause; Tibbs correctly held Michigan armed robbery categorically fits the residual clause because taking from a person/presence (with a weapon) presents an omnipresent risk of violence. | Affirmed: the conviction qualifies under the residual clause (Beckles revived the clause for purposes of review; Tibbs persuasive). |
| Whether this panel should ignore/reject prior Sixth Circuit precedent (Payne/Tibbs) | Panel should not follow Payne/Tibbs because Payne misapplied the categorical approach by focusing on more violent variants of the offense. | Stare decisis and prior-panel precedent bind unless convincingly overruled; Payne/Tibbs reasoning is adequate and persuasive. | Declined to overrule; Payne and Tibbs remain controlling for this issue in the Sixth Circuit context. |
Key Cases Cited
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenges)
- United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2016) (invalidated Guidelines’ residual clause in Sixth Circuit)
- United States v. Payne, 163 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 1998) (held larceny-from-the-person categorically presents risk of physical injury under residual clause)
- United States v. Patterson, 853 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2017) (affirmed use of residual clause for defendants sentenced while Pawlak was good law but appealed after Beckles)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach requires comparing statutory elements to the generic offense)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits evidence courts may consult when applying the categorical approach)