United States v. Mark Icker, 13 F.4th 321

Background:

Mark Icker, a part-time Pennsylvania police officer, coerced two women into oral sex during traffic stops and harassed three other women using his badge and authority.
He pleaded guilty to two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (deprivation of civil rights) via a plea agreement that did not mention SORNA or sex-offender registration, and included an appellate waiver.
At sentencing the district court imposed 180 months' imprisonment (rejecting a jointly recommended 144 months) and added SORNA registration as both a mandatory and an additional supervised-release condition, stating Icker must comply “as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency.”
Icker did not object at sentencing to the SORNA condition; he timely appealed after judgment was entered.
The Third Circuit held (1) Icker’s appellate waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily entered as to the SORNA issue (no notice in plea or colloquy), and (2) the district court plainly erred by imposing SORNA registration because Icker was not convicted of a SORNA-defined "sex offense," and delegating that legal determination to probation/state agencies would be an improper Article III abdication.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Icker’s appellate waiver bars review of the SORNA condition	Waiver should not apply because the plea agreement and plea colloquy never mentioned SORNA; he lacked notice that he was waiving the right to appeal such a condition	Waiver language was broad and the colloquy acknowledged a waiver of appeal rights; thus appeal should be barred	Waiver not enforced: court found waiver not knowingly and voluntarily entered as to SORNA, so appellate review permitted
Whether §242 convictions are “sex offenses” under SORNA so district court may order registration	Icker: §242 is not a SORNA-listed sex offense and does not necessarily have an element of sexual act/contact; court cannot impose SORNA on non-sex-offense conviction	Gov: Court may impose SORNA-related registration as a discretionary supervised-release condition even if statute does not expressly mandate it	Held for Icker: §242 convictions are not SORNA "sex offenses" here; district court plainly erred by imposing SORNA registration on a non-sex-offender
Whether a sentencing court may delegate the determination and imposition of SORNA duties to probation/state agencies by phrasing compliance as “as directed by” third parties	Icker: delegating the legal determination of who is a sex offender to probation/state agencies is an improper delegation of Article III judicial power	Gov: The district court’s language merely defers implementation details to probation/BOP/state agencies and thus is not a non-reviewable delegation	Held for Icker: Conditioning registration "as directed by" third parties improperly delegates the legal determination and is impermissible; court must decide whether SORNA applies

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Brown, 740 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2014) (interpreting limits of SORNA classification)
United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001) (limits on delegating sentencing conditions to probation)
United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (prohibiting impermissible delegation of judicial authority to probation)
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2001) (standards for enforcing appellate waivers)
United States v. Wilson, 707 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2013) (appellate-waiver framework and miscarriage-of-justice exception)
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain-error review four-part test)
Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012) (context on SORNA’s nationwide registration purpose)
United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d 441 (3d Cir. 2018) (discussing §242 elements and bodily integrity)