United States v. Marcus Moody
2 F.4th 180
| 4th Cir. | 2021Background
- At ~3:45 AM on Dec. 30, 2018, Newport News officer stopped a Volkswagen driven by Latoya Carter after observing driving violations; Marcus Moody was the front-seat passenger and was seen reach behind the driver’s seat.
- Search of the car uncovered: a Nike bag behind the driver’s seat containing ~75+ grams of cocaine, scales, baggies and gloves; a loaded Glock 43 hidden under the driver’s seat; a loaded Glock 22 hidden under the passenger seat; ammunition visible in the center console.
- Moody had about $3,900 in bundled cash across multiple pockets; Carter had repurchased the Glock 43 from a pawnshop the day before the stop.
- Stipulations at trial: both pistols were operable and had traveled in interstate commerce; Moody stipulated he was a convicted felon who knew of that conviction.
- Indictment and convictions: both were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine (§846), possession with intent to distribute (§841), and two §924(c) counts (possession of firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking). Moody was additionally convicted under §922(g)(1) as a felon in possession. Both appealed (sufficiency); Moody also challenged two jury instructions (Rehaif-related mens rea and aiding-and-abetting instruction).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov.) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency — Moody: possession of cocaine with intent to distribute | Circumstantial evidence (Moody’s furtive reach, presence in drug area, large secreted cash, proximity to drugs and paraphernalia) supports constructive possession and intent to distribute | No direct proof linking Moody to cocaine (no admissions, no forensics, no phone data); proximity + single movement insufficient (citing Blue) | Affirmed: totality of circumstantial evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find constructive possession and intent to distribute |
| Sufficiency — Carter: possession of cocaine with intent to distribute | As driver, Carter had inferred dominion/control over vehicle; ownership and concealment of Glock 43 next to Nike bag and its recent repurchase support knowledge and intent to distribute | Cocaine was in closed bag behind her seat; no furtive movements, no forensic tie, no admissions | Affirmed: driver status plus circumstantial evidence (gun ownership, concealment, repurchase) supported constructive possession and intent |
| Sufficiency — §924(c) (firearm in furtherance) | Weapons were loaded, concealed near drugs and drug proceeds, accessible, and consistent with dealer protection; expert testimony connected such guns to trafficking | Defendants lacked direct proof of possession/knowledge of firearms; proximity alone insufficient for constructive possession | Affirmed: jury could conclude both defendants constructively possessed the firearms and possessed them in furtherance of trafficking (considering Lomax factors) |
| Sufficiency — §846 conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute | Joint possession of drugs and two hidden loaded guns, Carter’s repurchase of Glock 43 day before, and other circumstances permitted inference of an agreement between the two | Little evidence of an agreement beyond joint presence and brief statement "that’s my girl"; no meetings, prior dealings, or co-conspirator testimony | Affirmed: although close, circumstantial evidence (joint possession of drugs/guns, concealment, repurchase) sufficed to let a jury infer a limited two-person agreement |
| Moody’s jury-instruction challenges (Rehaif mens rea for §922(g) and aiding-and-abetting for §924(c)) | Instruction correctly required knowledge of prior conviction per stipulation; aiding-and-abetting instruction adequate and any error did not cause prejudice | Rehaif requires proof defendant knew his status made firearm possession unlawful; aiding-and-abetting instruction should have required advance knowledge Carter would use firearms in furtherance | Rehaif claim rejected: knowledge of status (stipulated) sufficed; extension to knowledge that status is unlawful is not required. Aiding-and-abetting plain-error review failed: Moody could not show actual prejudice and jury could have convicted him as principal |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1992) (proximity plus a single furtive movement insufficient for constructive possession)
- United States v. Herder, 594 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2010) (constructive possession requires dominion, control, and knowledge; driver status relevant)
- United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (approach to reviewing circumstantial evidence and conspiracies)
- United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2012) (proximity is a relevant, but not dispositive, factor for constructive possession)
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (knowledge requirement applies to status element of §922(g))
- Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) (aiding-and-abetting a §924(c) offense requires advance knowledge of co-defendant’s firearm use)
- United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 2002) (factors for whether possession of firearm furthered a drug offense)
- United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1980) (inference that driver knows contraband in vehicle)
- United States v. Edmonds, 679 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2012) (conspiracy requires agreement separate from the immediate distribution conduct)
- United States v. Hackley, 662 F.3d 671 (4th Cir. 2011) (elements and limits of conspiracy proof)