907 F.3d 554
8th Cir.2018Background
- Marcus Eason was convicted of two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition; district court initially sentenced him as an Armed Career Criminal (ACCA) and imposed a 300‑month term.
- On direct appeal the conviction was affirmed but the sentence was vacated and remanded after the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson (2015) invalidated the ACCA residual clause; the record lacked proof that Eason had three qualifying ACCA predicates absent the residual clause.
- At resentencing the government supplemented the record with state court documents identifying which subsections of Arkansas battery statutes Eason had violated (third‑degree domestic battery § 5‑26‑305(a)(1) and first‑degree battery § 5‑13‑201(a)(8)).
- The district court reopened the record, applied the modified categorical approach, and concluded both Arkansas battery convictions qualified as ACCA violent‑felony predicates under the force clause, yielding an advisory guideline range of 262–327 months and a reduced sentence of 262 months.
- Eason appealed, arguing (1) the court erred in reopening the record, (2) the Arkansas battery convictions do not qualify under the ACCA force clause, and (3) the court plainly erred in applying guideline enhancements based on crimes of violence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Eason) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by reopening sentencing record to admit state court records | Reopening was improper; remand did not authorize supplementation | Remand did not prohibit reopening; district court may hear evidence it could originally have heard | No abuse of discretion; reopening permissible because changed law required additional proof |
| Whether Arkansas third‑degree domestic battery (§ 5‑26‑305(a)(1)) is an ACCA violent felony under the force clause | Statute could be violated without violent physical force; thus not categorically a violent felony | Ordinary elements involve purposeful infliction of physical injury, which requires violent force sufficient to cause pain/injury | Qualified as a violent felony under the force clause; circuit precedent controls |
| Whether Arkansas first‑degree battery (§ 5‑13‑201(a)(8), causing injury by means of a firearm) is an ACCA violent felony under the force clause | Could theorize non‑violent means; statute might sweep more broadly than federal force clause | Use of a firearm to cause physical injury necessarily involves force capable of causing pain/injury | Qualified as a violent felony under the force clause; prior Eighth Circuit decisions govern |
| Whether guideline enhancements for using/possessing firearm in connection with a crime of violence were plain error when raised for first time on appeal | Enhancements rely on categorical validity of state crimes of violence and thus were improper | Enhancement inquiry is factual (not categorical) and facts of Eason’s offenses (shooting incidents) support enhancement | No plain error; facts surrounding possession support finding he used/possessed firearm in connection with violent conduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining "physical force" as "violent force" capable of causing pain or injury)
- United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1992) (district court on remand may hear evidence it could have heard at initial sentencing)
- United States v. Winston, 845 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding Arkansas battery statute predicates qualify as violent felonies under force clause)
- United States v. Daniels, 625 F.3d 529 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding § 2K2.1 enhancement where firearm possession involved shooting)
- United States v. Swopes, 886 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (realistic‑probability test for whether a state statute sweeps more broadly than federal violent‑force definition)
- United States v. Pate, 854 F.3d 448 (8th Cir. 2017) (evaluating § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement based on conduct surrounding firearm possession)