United States v. Maberry, 193 F. Supp. 3d 724

Background

On April 8, 2014, Jackson Police Detective Anthony Fox observed Walter Maberry driving a dark-tinted SUV in a high-crime neighborhood and executed a traffic stop after noticing abrupt, evasive driving.
When Maberry rolled down his window, Fox smelled marijuana and Maberry consented to a search of the SUV; a K-9 (Alpha) alerted and officers found small amounts of marijuana and bundled currency.
Maberry was arrested; Fox then used K-9 Alpha to sniff near the front door of Maberry’s residence and around a Chevrolet Monte Carlo in the driveway; Alpha gave positive alerts.
Officers obtained and executed a search warrant for the residence, recovered crack cocaine and currency, and then obtained a separate warrant for the Monte Carlo, where they found a firearm (basis for the felon-in-possession charge).
The parties disputed timing and sequencing in Fox’s testimony, his report, and the contemporaneous UFC supporting the Monte Carlo warrant; the court credited the UFC as contemporaneous and found inconsistencies in Fox’s later testimony.
Maberry moved to suppress all evidence seized from the residence and the Monte Carlo as fruit of an unlawful search; the court held an evidentiary hearing and granted the motion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Was the initial traffic stop supported by reasonable suspicion?	Fox observed evasive, erratic driving in a high-crime area and had objectively articulable facts to detain.	Stop was pretextual/insufficient.	Held: Stop was supported by reasonable suspicion under Terry (stop lawful).
2) Was the K-9 sniff at the front door (porch/curtilage) lawful?	K-9 sniff was investigative and not a search under drug-sniff precedent.	Front-door sniff intruded on home/curtilage and required a warrant per Jardines.	Held: Front-door sniff was an unlawful search (no warrant/exigent circumstances).
3) Was the K-9 sniff of the Monte Carlo lawful (was car within curtilage)?	The driveway/car were beyond the curtilage (open to street), so the sniff was not a search.	The car-sniff was tainted by the prior unconstitutional curtilage search and related in sequence.	Held: Driveway/car were outside curtilage so the sniff itself was not a Fourth Amendment search; however, because officers used evidence from the unlawful home search in obtaining the car warrant, the car search was tainted.
4) Is the evidence from the Monte Carlo admissible or barred as fruit of the poisonous tree (including inevitable discovery / Miranda purging)?	Government: evidence lawful because car was outside curtilage; alternatively inevitable discovery or Maberry’s post-Miranda admissions purged the taint.	Maberry: car evidence was derived from the unlawful curtilage search and warrant application that relied on illegally seized drugs.	Held: Evidence from both the residence and the Monte Carlo is suppressed — the car search/warrant was derivative of the unlawful front-door search and no adequate break/inevitable-discovery or Miranda purge was shown.

Key Cases Cited

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes standard for investigatory stops and two-part Terry inquiry)
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (use of drug-sniffing dog on front porch is a search of the home/curtilage)
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (factors to determine curtilage versus open field)
United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2016) (driveway/open front yard not curtilage; dog sniff of vehicle in driveway not a search)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (presence in a high-crime area and unprovoked flight as factors for reasonable suspicion)
United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2004) (articulable facts/totality test for Terry stop)
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (dog sniffs of vehicles during lawful traffic stops are not searches)
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (K-9 sniff not a search in public places)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (fruit of the poisonous tree and tests for attenuation of taint)
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (standard for inevitable discovery doctrine)
United States v. Tovar, 719 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2013) (analysis of whether post-Miranda statements purge prior taint for verbal evidence)