851 F.3d 786
7th Cir.2017Background
- On Jan. 15, 2013, Lynn called the county sheriff and admitted cooking and using methamphetamine at a Golconda, Illinois residence; officers conducted a welfare check and later executed a search warrant that revealed remnants of a meth lab.
- NPLEX (pseudoephedrine purchase) logs showed co-defendants had recently bought pseudoephedrine; two co-occupants later cooperated with federal authorities.
- A federal grand jury indicted Lynn on conspiracy counts to manufacture methamphetamine and to possess pseudoephedrine; at trial the government introduced NPLEX records and a silent “shake-and-bake” demonstration video with expert narration.
- The jury convicted Lynn on the two conspiracy counts; the PSR classified him as a career offender based on two prior Illinois aggravated battery convictions, yielding a guidelines range of 210–262 months.
- The district court, relying on the PSR (to which Lynn did not object), imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 192 months; Lynn appealed, challenging (1) admission of the NPLEX logs, (2) admission of the video, and (3) the career-offender designation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lynn) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of NPLEX logs under the Confrontation Clause | NPLEX logs are testimonial (kept to police/state enforcement) and Crawford requires confrontation | Logs are business/public records kept for regulatory/administrative purposes and nontestimonial | Court: Logs are nontestimonial; admission did not violate Confrontation Clause (plain-error review) |
| Admissibility of “shake-and-bake” demonstration video | Video was prejudicial and differed from Lynn’s actual method, should have been excluded under Rule 403 | Video was demonstrative, explanatory, and corroborated by other testimony; probative value outweighed any prejudice | Court: No plain error in admitting video; not unduly prejudicial given corroborating evidence |
| Career-offender classification based on two Illinois aggravated battery convictions | Aggravated battery convictions do not necessarily qualify as "crimes of violence"; statute covers nonforceful, insulting contact | Under categorical/modified categorical approaches, Lynn’s charging documents show convictions for "causing bodily harm," which qualifies as use of force | Court: No plain error; records show convictions under the bodily-harm prong, which is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a)(1) |
| Use of PSR summaries (absence of state records before district court) | Reliance on unverified PSR summaries is improper for classifying prior crimes | Lynn did not object to PSR; parties may accept PSR summaries; underlying records were later produced and support classification | Court: No error — PSR undisputed; later-produced state records confirm the PSR summaries |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause protects testimonial statements)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (lab/forensic reports prepared for prosecution are testimonial)
- Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain-error review framework)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (categorical and modified categorical approaches for determining whether prior offenses qualify under federal sentencing statutes)
- United States v. Towns, 718 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2013) (NPLEX/MethCheck logs are nontestimonial business records)
- United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2015) (same: meth-purchase reports not prepared for prosecution and thus nontestimonial)
- United States v. Mashek, 606 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2010) (pseudoephedrine purchase logs maintained under state law are business records)
- Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2012) (Illinois battery causing bodily harm involves use or attempted use of physical force)