United States v. Lucio Hernandez, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10623

Hernandez, living partly in California and Arizona, bought five handguns at an Arizona gun show and listed an Arizona address on ATF purchase forms.
California law limited simultaneous purchases and imposed a ten-day waiting period; Hernandez had previously purchased guns in California and drove ~12 hours each way for the Arizona purchase.
Some of the purchased guns were later recovered in the possession of third parties in California; ATF investigated and concluded Hernandez was a California resident.
Hernandez was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) for willfully transporting firearms into his state of residence (California).
At trial, the government introduced evidence suggesting Hernandez may have later sold the guns (uncharged crimes) and the district court gave a willfulness instruction derived from Bryan v. United States.
The jury convicted Hernandez; he appealed arguing insufficient proof of willfulness for the charged act and that the broad instruction plus evidence of other crimes risked conviction for intent to commit a different offense.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of willfulness under § 922(a)(3)	Bryan permits proof that defendant knew his conduct was unlawful without knowing the specific statute; evidence showed unlawful conduct.	Hernandez argued the government failed to prove he willfully transported guns into California (mens rea as to the charged act).	Evidence, viewed favorably to prosecution, could support willfulness under Bryan, so sufficiency alone would likely stand.
Jury instruction on willfulness	The Bryan-form instruction is correct and need not tie willfulness to the specific charged act.	Instruction should have explicitly required willfulness as to transporting into California (concurrence of act and mens rea).	The court held the given Bryan instruction was too broad here because it could permit conviction based on intent to commit later/uncharged crimes.
Use of other-crimes evidence and harmlessness	Government argued evidence of later illegal distribution showed consciousness of guilt and supported willfulness.	Hernandez argued such evidence risked conviction for intent to commit a different crime and thus violated due process; any error was not harmless.	Combination of broad instruction and other-crimes evidence created a substantial likelihood jury convicted for intent to commit a different crime; reversal and remand required (harmlessness not established).

Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998) (willfulness requires knowledge that conduct is unlawful, not knowledge of the specific statute)
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (heightened mens rea required for certain technical statutes)
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) (knowingly structuring transactions requires specific intent)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reversing convictions on insufficiency of the evidence)
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (requirement that guilty mind coincide with guilty act)
United States v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2006) (interpretation that § 924’s willfulness uses the lower Bryan standard)
United States v. Henderson, 243 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2001) (heightened willfulness applied only in limited regulatory contexts)
Deck v. Jenkins, 814 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2016) (prosecutorial misstatements about elements can constitute constitutional trial error)