United States v. Lovo
263 F. Supp. 3d 47
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Defendant Pablo Lovo was convicted by a jury of (1) Hobbs Act conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and (2) using/carrying/possessing a firearm during a crime of violence and aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); judgment entered April 8, 2015.
- Sentenced March 26, 2015 to 64 months (Count One) and a consecutive 60 months (Count Two); 36 months supervised release concurrent.
- Lovo filed a timely appeal; while appeal was pending he moved for bail pending appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b).
- Government argued mandatory detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2) because § 924(c) carries a maximum of life imprisonment, triggering detention for offenses listed in § 3142(f)(1).
- Lovo argued an exception: his § 924(c) conviction is vulnerable under Johnson v. United States (void-for-vagueness of ACCA residual clause) and § 924(c)(3)(B) is similarly vague; he also raised other appeal issues and cited community ties and employment as support for release.
- The district court denied bail pending appeal, concluding Lovo did not show the required "exceptional reasons" and that the likelihood of success on the § 924(c) vagueness claim was insufficient given distinguishing textual and contextual differences from the ACCA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mandatory detention under § 3143(b)(2) applies | Lovo: § 3143(b) permits release pending appeal because he is not a flight risk and appeal raises substantial questions | Government: § 3143(b)(2) mandates detention when convicted of an offense listed in § 3142(f)(1), and § 924(c) is covered because its max is life | Court: § 3143(b)(2) applies; § 924(c) triggers mandatory detention absent exceptional reasons |
| Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson | Lovo: Johnson undermines analogous language; § 924(c) is void for vagueness so conviction unlikely to be sustained on appeal | Government: § 924(c)(3)(B) differs materially from ACCA residual clause (narrower language, nexus to use of force during offense) and courts have rejected extending Johnson | Court: The vagueness claim is a legitimate question but not likely enough to constitute "exceptional reasons" to justify release |
| Whether Dimaya and related cases compel a different result | Lovo: post-Johnson cases finding similar language vague support his claim | Government: Dimaya and others differ by context and scope; § 924(c)'s nexus to firearms limits vagueness concerns | Court: Dimaya does not compel relief; differences in context reduce its applicability |
| Whether other appeal issues or personal ties justify release | Lovo: challenges to evidence admission, suppression, entrapment, counsel, and sentencing plus family/employment mitigate flight/danger concerns | Government: Those common appeal claims and ties are not ‘‘exceptional’’ to overcome mandatory detention | Court: These factors are insufficiently extraordinary; bail denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (assessed whether attempted robbery statute qualifies as a crime of violence)
- United States v. Gonzalez-Ruiz, 794 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2015) (conspiracy to commit armed robbery and ACCA analysis)
- United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (distinguished § 924(c)(3)(B) from ACCA residual clause; rejected Johnson extension)
- United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016) (declined to apply Johnson to § 924(c))
- United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2016) (declined to extend Johnson to § 924(c))
- United States v. Dimaya, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (§ 16(b) defined crime of violence held void for vagueness; discussed for comparison)