United States v. Lonnie Lillard
935 F.3d 827
9th Cir.2019Background
- In 1998 Lonnie Lillard was sentenced to prison and ordered to pay $79,130.55 restitution; the court set the amount due immediately but did not set a payment schedule and Lillard paid little thereafter.
- In 2016 Lillard was detained pretrial on new federal bank-fraud charges at FDC SeaTac; while detained he received $6,671.81 in his inmate trust account.
- The U.S. Attorney sought to seize those funds under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) (MVRA), which requires that a person who "receives substantial resources . . . during a period of incarceration" apply them to restitution or fines.
- The district court granted the government’s motion and ordered the Bureau of Prisons to apply the $6,671.81 to Lillard’s 1998 restitution debt; Lillard appealed pro se.
- The Ninth Circuit appointed the Federal Defender as amicus counsel and considered whether § 3664(n) covers pretrial detention; the panel held it does not and reversed the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3664(n)'s phrase "period of incarceration" includes pretrial detention | Lillard: § 3664(n) should not apply to pretrial detainees; MVRA procedures and protections post-date conviction | Government: pretrial detainees are in federal custody and § 3664(n) applies; seizure lawful | Held: "period of incarceration" does not include pretrial detention; reversal |
| Mootness: whether Lillard’s subsequent conviction moots appeal | Lillard: return of funds remains meaningful relief; potential re-seizure is not certain | Government: post-conviction incarceration makes issue moot because § 3664(n) would then apply | Held: not moot; effective relief (return of funds) still possible and re-seizure uncertain |
| Standard of review: whether argument waived (plain error) or reviewed de novo | Lillard/Amicus: issue was presented to district court; is a pure legal question warranting de novo review | Government: argument raised first on appeal so only plain-error review | Held: de novo review appropriate (issue was presented, is legal, and no prejudice to government) |
| Statutory interpretation: whether ambiguity triggers rule of lenity | Lillard/Amicus: text, context, purpose point to post-conviction-only reading; any ambiguity resolved for defendant | Government (dissent): text is plain—"incarceration" ordinarily includes pretrial detention, so no lenity | Held: text and MVRA context support post-conviction reading; ambiguity resolved by rule of lenity for defendant |
Key Cases Cited
- Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684 (2018) (describing crimes covered by MVRA)
- Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019) (treating "imprisonment" and pretrial detention in statutory interpretation)
- United States v. Hughes, 914 F.3d 947 (5th Cir. 2019) (construing "substantial resources" narrowly as windfalls)
- Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012) (words gain content from statutory context)
- United States v. Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting "incarceration" by statute's structure and purpose)
- Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990) (rule of lenity applies to restitution provisions)