United States v. Lisa Elias
984 F.3d 516
| 6th Cir. | 2021Background
- The First Step Act (2018) lets incarcerated persons file compassionate-release motions directly, removing the BOP as the exclusive gatekeeper.
- U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2006) provides four categories of "extraordinary and compelling reasons," but its text refers to the BOP Director and predated the First Step Act.
- Lisa Elias (convicted 2016 of drug conspiracy) was sentenced to 108 months and is housed at FPC Alderson with a projected release in November 2024.
- Elias filed a compassionate-release motion in 2020 claiming hypertension increases her risk of severe COVID-19; the warden denied her request and administrative exhaustion was satisfied.
- The district court applied a two-part COVID-specific test (1. defendant at high risk of complications; 2. severe outbreak at facility) and, relying on CDC guidance and absence of reported cases at FPC Alderson, denied relief.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed: it held § 1B1.13 is not an "applicable policy statement" for inmate-filed motions and found no abuse of discretion in the denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to inmate-filed compassionate-release motions | District courts may identify "extraordinary and compelling" reasons themselves for inmate motions | § 1B1.13 should constrain courts because it defines "extraordinary and compelling reasons" | § 1B1.13 is not applicable to inmate-filed motions; courts need not follow it and may define E&C independently |
| Whether hypertension + COVID-19 risk qualifies as an "extraordinary and compelling" reason | Elias: hypertension places her at elevated risk of severe COVID-19 and warrants release | Government/district court: CDC guidance at the time did not list hypertension; no severe outbreak at her facility | Hypertension alone (without supporting records or facility outbreak) did not justify release; district court did not abuse discretion |
| Whether absence of medical records justified denial | Elias: court should accept her assertion of hypertension | Government: failure to produce medical records permits denial | Court could deny based on absence of corroborating medical records; alternative bases supported denial |
| Whether district court abused discretion by using its two-part COVID test | Elias: test was too rigid and produced an incorrect application | Government: test reasonably considered CDC guidance and facility conditions | No abuse of discretion; the court adequately explained its reasoning and applied a permissible standard |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020) (held § 1B1.13 not applicable to inmate-filed compassionate-release motions)
- United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) (permitted broader judicial identification of "extraordinary and compelling" reasons and criticized BOP practices)
- United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2020) (discussed § 3553(a) review and affirmed denials based on discretionary sentencing factors)
- United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020) (held § 1B1.13 not controlling for inmate-filed motions)
- United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020) (reached same conclusion about § 1B1.13)
- United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 2020) (held that the mere existence of COVID-19 in society/prisons does not independently justify compassionate release)
- Chavez-Mesa v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018) (requires district court to set forth sufficient reasoning for appellate review)
- United States v. Flowers, 963 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2020) (abuse-of-discretion standard for sentencing/modification review)