880 F.3d 226
5th Cir.2018Background
- On Aug 2, 2015, Lindsey Johnson left an apartment complex driving Jeremy McNeal’s Lexus; police pursued, arrested Johnson, and found two firearms and marijuana in the vehicle.
- Johnson was indicted on three counts: carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119), being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)), and brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)).
- Government case relied on eyewitness testimony (McNeal, Thompson, Harney) describing a gun-forced taking; defense claimed a drug transaction gone wrong and Johnson testified to a different account.
- Johnson was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment plus supervised release; the district court applied a two-level obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for perjured testimony.
- On appeal Johnson challenged (1) exclusion of Facebook posts impeaching McNeal, (2) government questioning about prior felonies and alleged prosecutorial misconduct, (3) § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement, and (4) sentencing enhancements treating prior Mississippi armed carjacking convictions as "crimes of violence" for guidelines and § 924(c).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of Facebook posts impeachment evidence | Posts impeach McNeal’s credibility and should have been admitted | Posts were properly excluded; any error was harmless | Even if exclusion erred, admission would not have had substantial effect given strong eyewitness and arrest evidence; harmless error. |
| Government eliciting number of prior felonies; alleged prosecutorial misconduct | Government’s question about "three prior felonies" violated Old Chief and prejudiced jury, warranting mistrial | Question only established number; defense had stipulated to a prior felony; no nature of convictions elicited; limiting instruction mitigated any prejudice | Old Chief inapplicable; remark (if improper) did not cast serious doubt on verdict given limiting instruction and strong evidence. |
| Sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for perjury | Johnson testified truthfully; enhancement penalizes exercise of right to testify | District court found Johnson willfully lied, contradicted eyewitnesses, and fled, supporting willful false testimony finding | Deferential review upheld enhancement: district court’s credibility findings were plausible and supported by record, but caution that § 3C1.1 shouldn’t chill right to testify. |
| Whether prior Mississippi armed carjackings and federal carjacking qualify as "crime of violence" for Guidelines and § 924(c) | Prior armed carjacking does not necessarily have element of "violent force"; statute could convict when firearm merely "readily available" | Mississippi statute and courts treat "use of a firearm"/force as involving threatened violent force; federal carjacking by intimidation requires violent-force threat; § 924(c)(3)(B) is constitutional under circuit precedent | Court held Mississippi armed carjacking counts as crimes of violence under Guidelines (physical force means violent force); § 924(c) conviction stands under binding circuit precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (limits admissibility of detailed prior-conviction proof where defendant concedes conviction)
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (harmless error standard: "substantial and injurious effect")
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
- Jones v. United States, 752 F.3d 1039 (5th Cir. 2014) (applying ACCA/Johnson construction to Guidelines’ "crime of violence")
- Dunnigan v. United States, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) (perjury may justify sentencing enhancement under obstruction guideline)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (Sentencing Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenge under Due Process)
- Rodriguez-Lopez v. United States, 756 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2014) (two-step prosecutorial-misconduct analysis: improper remark then prejudice assessment)