528 F.Supp.3d 1153
D. Haw.2021Background
- In 2006 Lii pled guilty to three methamphetamine offenses accounting for 104.6 grams of actual meth; a §851 special information based on two prior Hawaii drug convictions produced a mandatory life sentence.
- The two prior state convictions dated to 1988–89: sale of 0.27 g of cocaine (class B felony) and possession of ~3.09 g of cocaine (class C felony); only the 1988 conviction would qualify as a “serious drug felony” under the First Step Act.
- Lii has served 15 years in BOP custody, with a mixed institutional record (education, steady work, drug treatment, but four disciplinary infractions including a 2018 drug possession).
- Lii moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing (1) the First Step Act sentencing reforms create a gross disparity (life then versus 15-year mandatory minimum now) and (2) elevated COVID-19 risk (age 55, obesity, possible hypertension); administrative requests to the warden were denied and exhaustion was satisfied.
- The court concluded it is not bound by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 for defendant-filed motions, found the sentencing disparity (life v. 15 years) combined with Lii’s individual circumstances to be an "extraordinary and compelling" reason, and reduced Lii’s sentence to time served plus 14 days (with a ten-year term of supervised release and requested quarantine during final 14 days).
Issues
| Issue | United States' Argument | Lii's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exhaustion of administrative remedies | Lii hadn’t exhausted BOP procedures for COVID-based relief | Lii had applied and appealed to the warden; exhaustion satisfied after subsequent submission | Exhaustion satisfied after BOP denials; court reached merits |
| Applicability of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to defendant-filed motions | § 1B1.13 is the applicable policy statement and limits courts to listed reasons | § 1B1.13 is not binding for defendant-filed motions; courts may consider other extraordinary reasons | § 1B1.13 is not an applicable constraint here; court exercises independent discretion (following McCoy/Brooker reasoning) |
| Whether First Step Act sentencing disparity can be an "extraordinary and compelling" reason | The First Step Act is not retroactive; sentencing changes alone cannot justify release | The gross disparity between original life sentence and the 15-year mandatory minimum now applicable is an extraordinary and compelling, individualized reason | Court holds individualized, severe sentencing disparities (here life vs. 15 years) can constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons and do so in this case |
| § 3553(a) considerations and public safety | Lii’s offense seriousness and prison disciplinary history weigh against release | Lii served 15 years (equal to today’s mandatory minimum), has non-violent priors, rehabilitation efforts, and a release plan | § 3553(a) factors, viewed in whole, support release to time served plus supervised release; court orders reduction |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020) (courts may consider individualized sentencing disparities post-First Step Act when ruling on defendant-filed compassionate release motions)
- United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) (First Step Act removed BOP gatekeeping; courts have broader discretion to evaluate extraordinary and compelling reasons)
- United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020) (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is not an applicable policy statement for defendant-filed motions)
- United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020) (same conclusion regarding § 1B1.13 and district court discretion)
- Ledezma-Rodriguez v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 3d 498 (S.D. Iowa 2020) (district court may find sentencing disparities to be extraordinary and compelling in individual cases)
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (post‑offense rehabilitation is relevant to sentencing decisions)