United States v. Liddon Young
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1466
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Young pled guilty to three firearms offenses following May 2013 indictment for unlawful firearms distribution.
- District Court found Young lied to a probation officer about his knowledge and intent to sell to dealers; Judge Geraci credited a witness and imposed §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) and §3C1.1, denying §3E1.1 due to obstruction.
- Prosecution of the same acts also led to a §2K2.1(b)(5) trafficking enhancement.
- Young requested downward departure and a variance; Court did not explicitly rule on those requests but sentenced him to 15 years.
- On appeal, Young challenged the §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) double-counting, the §3C1.1 obstruction, and the §3E1.1 adjustment; challenged the lack of explicit discussion on departure/variance.
- Court vacated the enhancements for double-counting and obstruction, remanding for resentencing while addressing the acceptance of responsibility in light of the remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) double-counts with §2K2.1(b)(5) | Young argues double-counting prohibited when same conduct triggers both enhancements | Government contends Note 13(D) permits both when applicable | Yes; considered impermissible double-counting; remand for resentencing |
| Whether obstruction enhancement under §3C1.1 was supported | Young contends lack of specific intent to obstruct justice | Government argues false statements suffice under Lincecum when sworn | Remanded for proper factual findings; obstruction enhancement vacated on appeal |
| Whether acceptance of responsibility adjustment under §3E1.1 should apply | Young asserts adjustment could apply absent extraordinary circumstances | Court premised on obstruction finding | Remanded with §3E1.1 reconsidered after remand (dependent on §3C1.1 outcome) |
| Whether the district court adequately addressed downward departure and variance | Young challenged lack of explicit ruling on these requests | Court properly considered §3553(a) factors | No reversible error; not reaching substantive reasonableness due to remand |
| Whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable | Young argues sentence was unreasonable given circumstances | Court’s discretion supports the sentence | Not reached; remanded before substantive review |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Maloney, 406 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2005) (double-counting principles in Guidelines)
- United States v. Morris, 350 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2003) (limitations on double-counting in Guidelines)
- United States v. Bradbury, 189 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 1999) (necessity of an operatorily explicit intent to obstruct)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (U.S. 2007) (procedural and substantive review standards for sentencing)
- United States v. Lincecum, 220 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2000) (necessity of specific intent to obstruct when statements are not sworn)
- United States v. Brown, 321 F.3d 347 (2d Cir. 2003) (requirement to show intent to obstruct under §3C1.1)
- United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2006) (consideration of §3553(a) factors in sentencing)
- United States v. Tutty, 612 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2010) (procedural vs substantive review framework for sentencing)