885 F.3d 1099
8th Cir.2018Background
- Lee Paul was convicted by a jury of three counts under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)) and sentenced to 396 months’ imprisonment; he appealed.
- Victims: A.S. (19), Z.S. (12), and K.J. (16). Paul recruited, transported, housed, supervised advertising, collected proceeds, and controlled victims’ movements and contacts.
- Alleged conduct included threats, rape, physical violence, confiscation of IDs/phones/money, directives to solicit customers online, and congratulatory texts after a minor’s first commercial sex act.
- Superseding indictment: Count I (Z.S.) — trafficking a minor <14 and use of force/fraud/coercion; Count II (K.J.) — trafficking a minor <18 and use of force/fraud/coercion; Count III (A.S.) — trafficking an adult via force/fraud/coercion.
- District court instructed jury on statutory definitions of coercion and serious harm and defined fraud as “deception practiced in order to induce another.” Jury convicted on all counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for Z.S. (Count I) | Paul argued Z.S. did not commit commercial sex acts while with him and he did not place ads or arrange the acts. | Government argued Paul harbored, threatened, raped, directed Z.S. to be prostituted, and benefitted from the venture. | Affirmed: evidence sufficient; Paul knew her age and used/benefitted from coercive means. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for K.J. (Count II) | Paul argued K.J. did not engage in commercial sex acts while with him. | Government argued §1591 penalizes acts intending to cause minors to be prostituted; harboring/transporting minors suffices. | Affirmed: Congress criminalized future-directed conduct; evidence supported harboring and intent. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for A.S. (Count III) | Paul argued A.S. did not identify a specific commercial sex act caused by his coercion. | Government relied on A.S.’s testimony of repeated sexual assault, threats, control of ID/phone/money, and prevention of leaving. | Affirmed: victim testimony permitted finding force/fraud/coercion caused commercial sex. |
| Duplicity and unanimity of counts | Paul argued each count joined multiple distinct offenses causing potential non‑unanimous verdicts. | Government and court: §1591 lists alternative means of committing a single offense; jury was instructed to make separate findings for trafficking minors and trafficking by force/fraud/coercion. | Affirmed: not duplicitous; jury made required separate unanimous findings. |
| Vagueness of jury instructions (fraud/coercion) | Paul argued definitions rendered §1591 void for vagueness as applied. | Government and court: definitions were consistent with statutory text and common meaning; alternative grounds (minority/force) and overwhelming evidence foreclosed prejudice. | Affirmed: no plain error; instructions provided fair notice and did not affect substantial rights. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Tillman, 765 F.3d 831 (8th Cir.) (standard for sufficiency review)
- United States v. Cole, 721 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir.) (reversal standard for sufficiency)
- United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir.) (TVPA agnosticism about who causes the child to engage in the commercial sex act)
- United States v. Wearing, 865 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.) (statutory language contemplates future-directed causation for minors)
- United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir.) (similar interpretation of §1591)
- United States v. Geddes, 844 F.3d 983 (8th Cir.) (credibility determinations are for the jury)
- United States v. Bell, 761 F.3d 900 (8th Cir.) (force/fraud/coercion sufficient under §1591)
- United States v. Nattier, 127 F.3d 655 (8th Cir.) (duplicity defined)
- United States v. Karam, 37 F.3d 1280 (8th Cir.) (risk of non‑unanimity from duplicity)
- United States v. Moore, 184 F.3d 790 (8th Cir.) (statute that lists alternative means may be charged conjunctively without duplicity concern)
- United States v. Stegmeier, 701 F.3d 574 (8th Cir.) (unanimous findings cure duplicity risk)
- United States v. Fry, 792 F.3d 884 (8th Cir.) (Rule 12 and timeliness for duplicity/multiplicity claims)
- United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824 (8th Cir.) (standards for raising ineffective assistance on direct appeal)
- United States v. Cook, 782 F.3d 983 (8th Cir.) (vagueness doctrine applied to criminal statutes)
- Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999) (instructions considered in context of whole charge)
- United States v. Maynes, 880 F.3d 110 (4th Cir.) (TVPA definitions provide fair notice)
- United States v. Hansen, 791 F.3d 863 (8th Cir.) (plain‑error framework)