United States v. Ledinson Chavez
951 F.3d 349
| 6th Cir. | 2020Background
- Four men (Lezcano the mastermind, Chavez, Betancourt, Diaz) ran chiropractic clinics that billed insurers for injections that were never provided; they recruited and paid patients (many from Jeffboat).
- Clinics submitted out-of-network provider applications including Todd Black’s ID without his consent; one application (Ledic Therapy Group) also contained Chavez’s driver’s license, SSN, and a cover-sheet signature resembling his.
- Conspirators created duplicate business entities and parallel bank accounts (Kentucky/Florida) to receive and move insurance payments; Chavez opened some accounts and deposited UnitedHealthcare checks.
- Diaz kept a notebook with cryptic entries including pages labeled “Papo” (Chavez’s nickname) and an entry reading “18300 Mio y Papo”; the government connected that entry to an $18,300 check.
- Chavez was convicted at trial of health-care fraud, conspiracy to commit health-care fraud, aggravated identity theft, and conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering; he appealed on sufficiency, evidentiary (hearsay), jury-instruction, and sentencing grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Chavez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency — aggravated identity theft | Ledic packet used Black’s ID without consent and included Chavez’s license/SSN and a signature—jury could infer knowing use | No proof Chavez knew Black hadn’t authorized use; Black had provided docs for other clinics | Affirmed — viewing evidence in govt’s favor, a rational jury could find Chavez knowingly used Black’s ID (Jackson standard) |
| Sufficiency — conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering | Duplicate entities/accounts and Chavez’s role (opening accounts, depositing checks) show transactions of unlawful proceeds with intent to conceal (even from chiropractors) | Depositing checks was part of the fraud act itself so funds weren’t yet "proceeds"; account in Chavez’s name negates concealment purpose | Affirmed — health-care fraud here is a scheme-to-defraud (liability attaches when false claims submitted); concealment purpose can be partial and aimed at specific persons (e.g., chiropractors) |
| Hearsay — Diaz notebook & Ledic packet | Notebook entries were admissible to explain their meaning; Ledic packet statements (including signature) admissible as party/co-conspirator admissions | Notebook and packet were hearsay (and signature double-hearsay); court should have redacted or limited jury consideration | Affirmed — most notebook uses were not hearsay or any hearsay was harmless (one link to $18,300 was cumulative); Ledic packet admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)/(E) |
| Jury instructions — aiding & abetting; quoting indictment; multiple conspiracies | Instructions properly explained accomplice intent (must intend to help the specific crime), included neutral indictment excerpts, and no multiple-conspiracy instruction was necessary | Rosemond requires explicit advance-knowledge wording for aiding/abetting layered offenses; quoting indictment prejudicial; court should have given multiple-conspiracies instruction | Affirmed — accomplice instruction sufficiently required intent/knowledge; quoting indictment was permissible with proper limiting instruction; multiple-conspiracy instruction unnecessary because proof of conspiracy among some charged parties sufficed |
| Sentencing enhancement (§3B1.1(c)) | Chavez recruited, paid, supervised Orlando Rodriguez (a paid recruiter), justifying manager/supervisor adjustment | Chavez did not manage or supervise participants | Affirmed — evidence showed Chavez supervised Rodriguez’s recruitment and payments; co-managers may qualify for the enhancement |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) (advance-knowledge requirement for aiding-and-abetting a compound offense)
- Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008) (elements and purpose requirement of money-laundering statute)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (scheme-to-defraud liability attaches upon formation of the scheme)
- Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) (conjecture is not a permissible basis for reasonable doubt)
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (harmless-error standard for evidentiary errors)
- Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988) (sufficiency review considers all evidence admitted at trial)
- United States v. Turner, 465 F.3d 667 (6th Cir. 2006) (scheme-to-defraud discussion in healthcare-fraud context)
- United States v. Kerley, 784 F.3d 327 (6th Cir. 2015) (timing/proceeds analysis for money-laundering convictions)
- United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (plurality opinion on definition/timing of "proceeds")