United States v. Lebreault Feliz, 807 F.3d 1

Background

Lebreault was convicted of two counts of passport fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1542), one count of false representation to the SSA (42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(6)), and one count of theft of public money (18 U.S.C. § 641); sentenced to 33 months' imprisonment and restitution.
First passport fraud: in 2003 Lebreault applied at the U.S. embassy in Caracas using the false identity "Juan Antonio Castro Pizarro" and obtained a temporary passport to return to the U.S.; upon arrival he admitted using a false identity and gave a different false name.
Second passport fraud: in 2007 Lebreault applied from the U.S. for a passport for his U.S.-citizen minor daughter, signing the application using the false Rodríguez identity and providing false parental identifying information.
Other convictions: in 2011 he applied for a replacement Social Security card using a false identity and, between 2006–2013, used a false identity to obtain Section 8 housing benefits totaling $121,077.
At trial Lebreault sought to present duress and necessity defenses to the first passport count based on an alleged 2003 violent incident in the Dominican Republic and subsequent threats; the district court excluded those defenses as legally insufficient and denied related jury instructions.
Lebreault moved for acquittal on the second passport-count, arguing a U.S.-citizen child was entitled to a passport so his false statements could not be "contrary to the laws regulating issuance of passports;" the district court denied the motion and the First Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether district court erred in barring duress/necessity defenses to first passport fraud count	Government: proffer insufficient to show legal elements (imminence, no reasonable alternative); court may exclude inadequate proffers	Lebreault: proffered violent threats and family targeting in Dominican Republic justified duress/necessity defenses	Court: Affirmed exclusion — proffer failed to show imminent harm or lack of reasonable alternatives (six-month lapse, safe relocation)
Whether exclusion of those defenses prejudiced ability to defend other counts	Government: Lebreault conceded below he could not in good faith assert those defenses for other counts	Lebreault: exclusion prejudiced defense across counts	Court: Issue waived — Lebreault conceded below and did not preserve argument on appeal
Whether second passport-count (making false statements for a passport for his U.S.-citizen child) fails because child was entitled to a passport / statements not "contrary to" passport laws	Lebreault: child’s citizenship meant issuance was lawful, so false statements were not "contrary to" passport rules	Government: §1542’s first clause does not require materiality; false parental identity violated regulation and could have influenced issuance	Court: Affirmed conviction — false parental information violated 22 C.F.R. §51.28 and could materially influence issuance; conviction stands; materiality not required but would be satisfied here
Whether §1542’s first clause requires specific intent and whether defendant preserved that argument	Government: argument waived because not developed in briefs	Lebreault: suggested possible lack of specific intent at oral argument	Court: Declined to decide the specific-intent question because defendant waived it on appeal

Key Cases Cited

Bailey v. United States, 444 U.S. 394 (establishes that an affirmative-defense proffer must meet a minimum factual standard to present to a jury)
Maxwell v. United States, 254 F.3d 21 (a district court may preclude presentation of legally insufficient affirmative defenses)
Diaz-Castro v. United States, 752 F.3d 101 (defines duress elements)
Salinas v. United States, 373 F.3d 161 (interpreting §1542 and materiality requirement)
Contento-Pachon v. United States, 723 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. imminence and lack-of-alternatives analysis in duress claim)
Bello v. United States, 194 F.3d 18 (no imminence when cooling-off period exists)
Arthurs v. United States, 73 F.3d 444 (reasonableness of alternatives where defendant had opportunity to avoid crime)