United States v. Lazaro Lobaton-Andrade, 861 F.3d 538

Lobaton‑Andrade pleaded guilty in Arkansas (2007) to manslaughter and was later deported; he was convicted in Texas of illegal reentry and sentenced to 46 months.
The PSR applied a 16‑level § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) enhancement, treating the Arkansas manslaughter as a "crime of violence," yielding an advisory range of 46–57 months.
Lobaton‑Andrade objected, arguing Arkansas § 5‑10‑104(a) is broader than the Guidelines’ enumerated "manslaughter" because it includes negligence‑based (and other) mental states.
The Government argued the statute is divisible (separate alternative elements) and that Shepard documents showed Lobaton‑Andrade was convicted for reckless manslaughter.
The Fifth Circuit analyzed divisibility under the categorical/modified categorical framework and Mathis, concluding Arkansas treats the statute’s mental‑state subsections as alternative means, not separate elements.
Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing because the Government failed to prove the prior conviction qualified as a "crime of violence."

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Arkansas manslaughter § 5‑10‑104(a) is divisible so the modified categorical approach can identify a qualifying "manslaughter" alternative	Lobaton‑Andrade: statute is indivisible; it covers broader conduct (including negligence) so conviction cannot qualify	Government: subsections set out distinct elements (different culpable mental states); Shepard docs show reckless manslaughter	Statute is indivisible; subsections are alternative means, not separate elements; Shepard materials do not conclusively show divisibility
Whether the prior Arkansas conviction qualifies as an enumerated "manslaughter" crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2	Lobaton‑Andrade: prior conviction does not categorically match Guideline "manslaughter" because statute covers more conduct	Government: modified categorical approach narrows to reckless subsection, making it a categorical match	Prior conviction does not qualify; 16‑level enhancement improperly applied

Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (statute is divisible only if it lists alternative elements rather than alternative means)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limited set of documents may be consulted to determine what offense a defendant was convicted of)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach compares statutory elements to generic offense)
United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2016) (review of categorical/modified categorical approaches)
United States v. Howell, 838 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying Mathis divisibility analysis)
Gomez‑Perez v. Lynch, 829 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing elements from means under categorical approach)