United States v. Lawrence Oakie, 993 F.3d 1051

Lawrence Oakie was convicted by a jury of three counts of abusive sexual contact of a child for touching a 10‑year‑old (B.J.W.); the victim’s older sister witnessed the conduct and both identified Oakie.
The government introduced testimony about a prior allegation by a different 10‑year‑old (L.P.) that Oakie had molested her years earlier; the jury heard testimony about that allegation but was not told Oakie had been acquitted.
Oakie was found guilty on all counts; at sentencing the district court applied a five‑level U.S.S.G. §4B1.5(b)(1) enhancement for a “pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct,” based in part on the prior allegation.
The §4B1.5 enhancement raised the Guidelines range from 51–63 months to 87–108 months; the court imposed a 96‑month prison sentence.
On appeal Oakie argued (1) the district court erred by refusing to allow him to present the prior acquittal at trial and (2) the court improperly considered acquitted conduct at sentencing and relied on a mistaken time‑served credit.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the admissibility and constitutional challenges and finding no reversible procedural or substantive sentencing error.

Issue	Oakie’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Admissibility of prior acquittal at trial	The jury should have been allowed to know Oakie was acquitted of the prior allegation to rebut its prejudicial effect	Acquittal is irrelevant to innocence, constitutes hearsay, and impeachment avenues were available	Exclusion proper: acquittal irrelevant/hearsay; impeachment alternatives existed and any error was harmless
Use of acquitted conduct at sentencing under §4B1.5	Court may not base enhancement on conduct of which Oakie was acquitted	Court may consider acquitted conduct if proven by a preponderance under circuit precedent and the Guidelines commentary	Affirmed: court permissibly found prior conduct by preponderance and applied enhancement
Alleged reliance on incorrect time‑served credit	Misstatement about time‑served credit affected sentencing procedure	Court clarified the credit amount was not a factor; prosecutor’s slip did not affect sentence	No procedural or plain error; statement that credit not a factor cures issue
Substantive reasonableness of 96‑month sentence	Sentence is substantively unreasonable	Within‑Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable	Affirmed: 96 months is substantively reasonable

United States v. Vega, 676 F.3d 708 (8th Cir. 2012) (admissibility review and hearsay/impeachment limits)
United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280 (8th Cir. 2003) (acquittal does not establish innocence; hearsay concerns)
United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting no hearsay‑exception for acquittals)
United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2001) (credibility impeachment alternatives can cure prejudice)
United States v. Hale, 1 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1993) (jury instructions can alleviate prejudice)
United States v. White Bull, 646 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 2011) (harmless‑error standard for evidentiary mistakes)
United States v. Papakee, 573 F.3d 569 (8th Cir. 2009) (circuit law permitting consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing)
United States v. No Neck, 472 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2007) (preponderance standard for sentencing findings)
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (assessment of clearly erroneous facts at sentencing)
United States v. Jordan, 877 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 2017) (plain‑error review when objections are inadequate)
United States v. Washington, 893 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 2018) (within‑Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable)