United States v. Laureano-Salgado, 933 F.3d 20

Background

Defendants José Laureano-Salgado and Pedro Ramírez-Rivera (La ONU members) were convicted of VICAR and related gun charges for participating in the murder of La Rompe member "Pekeke." Three cooperating La ONU witnesses at trial implicated the defendants in planning, equipping, and providing a rescue team for the killing.
After conviction and appeal, defense counsel obtained post-trial materials and testimony from La Rompe members (not present at the defendants' trial) suggesting La Rompe may have killed Pekeke in an internal power struggle and that multiple, shifting actors (including Joshua) were implicated.
Defendants moved for a new trial based on the newly disclosed La Rompe statements and argued a Brady violation because the government acquired those statements while the defendants’ appeal was pending but did not disclose them earlier.
The district court denied the new-trial motion for three alternative reasons: (1) the new statements would not outweigh eyewitness testimony of La ONU coconspirators; (2) the statements were of limited probative value and inconsistent; and (3) likely inadmissible hearsay/lacking personal knowledge.
On appeal, defendants argued (a) a Brady-based, more favorable standard applied to post-appeal disclosures; (b) the new evidence undermines confidence in the VICAR verdict (or, alternatively, would probably produce an acquittal); and (c) prosecutorial misconduct/perjury. The First Circuit affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Brady requires disclosure of evidence the government acquired after trial but while the case was on direct appeal	Brady applies because the government learned of La Rompe statements during appeal and failed to disclose; therefore the less onerous Brady/"undermine confidence" test governs	Government: Brady requires disclosure only of evidence existing at trial; post-trial acquisitions do not trigger Brady; ordinary new-trial standard applies	Court held Brady does not apply to evidence acquired post-trial absent proof government knew of it before/during trial; ordinary new-trial standard governs and defendants waived attempts to distinguish controlling precedent
Standard for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence (ordinary vs. Brady)	Laureano-Salgado (fallback): even under ordinary standard the new evidence would probably produce an acquittal	Government: ordinary four-factor test applies and defendants cannot satisfy the actual-probability-of-acquittal prong	Court applied ordinary test and concluded defendants failed to show the new evidence would probably produce an acquittal; no abuse of discretion
Whether the new statements constituted prosecutorial misconduct/perjured testimony by government witnesses	Defendants: La Rompe statements show trial witnesses perjured themselves and prosecutors presented false testimony	Government: argument was not presented below and is waived; additionally defendants failed to develop legal/analytical support	Court found the perjury/misconduct claim waived for lack of presentation below and inadequate briefing on appeal
Admissibility and weight of La Rompe statements at retrial (hearsay/personal knowledge/credibility)	Defendants: statements are admissible (rebuttal, statement-against-interest, confrontation/right-to-present), and corroborative; judge’s credibility findings were erroneous	Government: statements are hearsay, speculative, lacked firsthand knowledge, and were inconsistent; even if admissible they corroborate trial facts and do not undermine verdict	Court agreed with district court that statements were equivocal, partly hearsay, corroborated many trial facts (e.g., Joshua as shooter), and would not likely outweigh trial testimony; not sufficiently compelling to warrant a new trial

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Peake, 874 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2017) (distinguishing ordinary new-trial test from Brady-based standard)
United States v. Maldonado‑Rivera, 489 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2007) (Brady requires disclosure only of exculpatory/impeaching information known before or during trial)
Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (Brady is the wrong framework for evaluating post-conviction disclosure obligations)
United States v. Hernández‑Rodríguez, 443 F.3d 138 (1st Cir. 2006) (new evidence that would greatly undermine conviction can require reversal where district court failed adequately to account for its import)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality standard framed in terms of undermining confidence in the outcome)
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity and ethical obligations to disclose post-conviction information)