United States v. Lashawn Harris, 950 F.3d 1015

Lashawn Harris pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine and was sentenced after the district court classified him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
The career-offender designation rested on two prior Arkansas convictions: (1) a 2002 Class B felony for Terroristic Act (Ark. Code § 5-13-310) and (2) a 2006 conviction for Second Degree Battery (Ark. Code § 5-13-202(a)).
Applying the career-offender enhancement raised Harris's Guidelines range from 87–108 months to 188–235 months; the district court imposed 240 months as an upward variance.
On appeal Harris challenged the career-offender classification and also argued his sentence was unreasonable and that the court departed upward without proper notice.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the career-offender determination as to the Terroristic Act conviction, concluding that the Class B statute is indivisible and overinclusive (so it is not categorically a crime of violence), but affirmed that the Second Degree Battery conviction qualified as a crime of violence.
Because reversal required resentencing, the court did not decide Harris’s separate arguments about overall sentence reasonableness or notice for the upward variance.

Issue	Harris's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Ark. § 5-13-310(a),(b)(1) (Class B Terroristic Act) is a categorical crime of violence	The statute allows intent to injure property, not only persons, so it lacks an element requiring use/threat of physical force against a person	The statute’s language and jury instructions show the alternatives define elements that can qualify as crimes of violence	The statute is overinclusive and indivisible (means, not separate elements); Terroristic Act conviction is not a categorical crime of violence; career-offender enhancement cannot rest on it
Whether Second Degree Battery (Ark. § 5-13-202(a)) is a crime of violence	Harris argued Shepard documents were inconclusive about which mens rea applied	Charging document shows he was charged with purposeful conduct causing serious physical injury	The court affirmed that this conviction qualified as a crime of violence
Whether district court erred in imposing an upward variance without notice / sentence reasonableness	Harris contended the upward variance lacked proper notice and was substantively unreasonable	Government defended the variance based on community safety and firearm-related conduct	Court did not resolve these issues on appeal because remand for resentencing was required after reversing the career-offender finding

Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (statute divisibility and limits on modified categorical approach)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (permissible record materials for modified categorical inquiry)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (distinguishing divisible statutes from indivisible ones)
United States v. McMillan, 863 F.3d 1053 (8th Cir. 2017) (analyzing means vs. elements and use of state law sources)
United States v. Myers, 928 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing differently structured Arkansas terroristic-threatening statute)
United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2016) (Second Degree Battery mens rea alternatives and divisibility)
United States v. Bearden, 780 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for crime-of-violence determinations)