United States v. Laquann Dawn
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 13218
| 8th Cir. | 2012Background
- Dawn pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),(b)(1)(B)(iii).
- PSR: base offense level 18; career-offender enhancement under §4B1.1 for two Arkansas felonies raised level to 34 and history to VI.
- Two prior felonies: Arkansas second‑degree sexual assault (2002) and second‑degree battery (2006) listed as crimes of violence; PSR yielded total offense level 31 after acceptance of responsibility and led to a proposed range of 188–235 months.
- Dawn objected to career-offender status on grounds that (i) no proof he had counsel or waived counsel at the times of conviction, (ii) double counting against due process, and (iii) no evidence that the convictions were crimes of violence.
- At sentencing, the court summarily overruled objections, accepted the government’s framing of the crimes as violent, and imposed 188 months’ imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release.
- On appeal, the court remanded to resolve whether the prior convictions were crimes of violence and whether the record should be reopened for evidence on remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are Arkansas second-degree battery and sexual assault crimes of violence under §4B1.1? | Dawn argues both offenses are not categorically crimes of violence. | Dawn contends statutes are overinclusive and not clearly crimes of violence. | Second-degree battery is overinclusive; requires modified categorical approach to determine if Dawn’s specific conviction was for a crime of violence. |
| Is second-degree sexual assault categorically a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a)(1)/(a)(2)? | Dawn disputes categorization; argues insufficient evidence. | Government contends offenses involving minors or vulnerable victims carry substantial risk of force and are crimes of violence. | Arkansas second-degree sexual assault is categorically a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a)(1) or (a)(2). |
| Was a modified categorical approach necessary for the battery conviction? | Record insufficient to classify the battery conviction without examining the statute’s scope. | Government argues proper to treat under ordinary statute language. | Yes; modified categorical approach required to determine whether the battery conviction was for a crime of violence. |
| Should the case be remanded for the government to present further evidence on remand? | Remand should be limited to resenting under existing record; government had opportunity. | Record should be reopened to determine the precise nature of the battery conviction. | Remand with potential record expansion to determine whether the battery conviction is a crime of violence and whether Dawn qualifies as a career offender. |
| What is the proper remand plan? | Resentence based on total offense level 18 and criminal history II. | Allow evidence on remand to determine crimes of violence and career-offender status. | Vacate sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with the opinion, allowing evidence on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476 (8th Cir. 2011) (defines 'physical force' in §4B1.2(a)(1))
- United States v. Parks, 620 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 2010) (articulates categorical vs. modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 324 (8th Cir. 2010) (recognized when to allow expansion of the record on remand under mistaken law)
- United States v. Ossana, 638 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussed expansion of the record and limits on judicial factfinding under Shepard framework)
- United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2008) (principles for coercing analysis of crimes of violence involving minors)