United States v. Lander
668 F.3d 1289
| 11th Cir. | 2012Background
- Lander, an attorney and Dixie County official, ran GenSpec Labs, LLC and assisted River Shores real-estate developers seeking county approval.
- River Shores funds totaling $820,000 were deposited to a Lander special account to be used for development-related expenses, with withdrawals for personal use.
- River Shores developers received some funds (e.g., $200,000 cashier’s check and $300,000) but were told the rest would be released when the project proceeded.
- GenSpec investors were misled about contracts, profits, and dividends; one investor, Kathy Veach, invested $1 million with a portion paid via a loan arrangement that was illusory.
- Indictment charged Lander with River Shores mail fraud, money laundering predicated on that mail fraud, and GenSpec-related mail fraud.
- A jury convicted on sixteen counts; the district court later denied motions for judgment of acquittal and sentenced Lander accordingly.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there was a material variance from the indictment on Count Two | Lander argues the trial proof differed from the indictment’s allegations. | Lander contends the proof at trial substantially varied from the charged River Shores scheme. | Yes; substantial prejudice requires reversal. |
| Whether the money-laundering counts fail due to the variance on Count Two | Counts Four–Fourteen rely on Count Two's mail fraud predicate. | If Count Two is invalid, the money-laundering counts fail as predicated on it. | Yes; these convictions are reversed and vacated. |
| Whether GenSpec mail fraud convictions (Counts Fifteen–Eighteen) are supported by sufficient evidence | GenSpec scheme involved deceiving investors about profits and contracts; mail use alleged. | GenSpec itself need not be fraudulent; only a scheme to defraud GenSpec investors is required. | Supported; verdicts affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir.1999) (material variance and prejudice analysis for indictments)
- Prince, 883 F.2d 953 (11th Cir.1989) (variance and prejudice standard)
- Jenkins, 779 F.2d 606 (11th Cir.1986) (variance as sufficiency challenge)
- Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir.1986) (indictment-vs-trial proof variance standard)
- Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir.2006) (money laundering predicate requirements)
- Wingate, 997 F.2d 1429 (11th Cir.1993) (mail fraud elements and proof standard)
- Svete, 556 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir.2009) (en banc discussion on mail and fraud standards)
- Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.2009) (elements of a scheme to defraud and mail usage)
- Narog, 372 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir.2004) (material variance as reversible error)
- Thompson, 118 F.3d 1442 (11th Cir.1997) (purpose of indictment notice and defense preparation)
- Berger, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (indictment notice and due process principles)
- Ward, 197 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir.1999) (standard for sufficiency review on acquittal)
- Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir.2006) (de novo review of sufficiency of evidence)