United States v. Lakento Smith, 958 F.3d 494

Smith was convicted in 2006 on four counts: conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (counts 1–2), possession with intent to distribute powder cocaine (count 3), and felon-in-possession (count 4).
A §851 information and career-offender treatment raised his exposure to a statutory mandatory life term for counts 1–2 and produced a Guidelines range of 360 months to life (offense level 37, CH VI).
At the original sentencing the judge initially selected 360 months but, after being informed of the mandatory statutory minimum, imposed life.
The First Step Act made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive for covered offenses; parties agreed counts 1–2 were covered and the district court reduced those counts to 360 months (bottom of the amended Guidelines), concurrent with the unchanged 360-month sentence for count 3, using a modified AO 247 form and without a hearing.
Smith appealed, arguing (1) the First Step Act required a plenary resentencing of the entire package (including reconsideration of count 3) and (2) the use of the form AO 247 without fuller explanation or a hearing rendered the sentence procedurally unreasonable.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Scope of First Step Act relief — must court conduct a plenary resentencing?	Smith: court should reopen full sentencing, consider new mitigation and all counts (including count 3).	Gov: First Step Act relief is a §3582(c) limited modification; no plenary resentencing or full rehearing required.	Affirmed: First Step Act authorizes a limited sentence modification under §3582(c); plenary resentencing is not required.
Procedural reasonableness — was the modified sentence inadequately explained because the court used the AO 247 form and did not hold a hearing?	Smith: Form order and no hearing failed to show §3553(a) consideration and justification for not imposing a below-Guidelines sentence.	Gov: (1) appeal limited by procedural rules (Bowers); (2) the form plus the original sentencing record suffices; Chavez‑Meza permits form orders.	Court assumed jurisdiction and held the form order (together with the original sentencing record and lack of new mitigation) adequately explained the result; no abuse of discretion.

United States v. Alexander, 951 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act reductions treated as limited §3582(c) modifications)
Hegwood v. United States, 934 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act does not authorize plenary resentencing)
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (§3582(c)(2) authorizes only limited sentence adjustments)
Chavez‑Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018) (Supreme Court upheld use of a form order in §3582(c) sentence modifications when record permits review)
United States v. Flack, 941 F.3d 238 (6th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing limited modification from plenary resentencing)
United States v. Beamus, 943 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2019) (Fair Sentencing Act retroactivity discussion)
United States v. Bowers, 615 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2010) (limitations on appeals raising procedural‑reasonableness challenges to §3582 reductions)