United States v. Lajeunesse, 85 F.4th 679

In 2018 Lajeunesse was convicted in New York state for possessing a child “sexual performance” and placed on interim probation with written conditions that authorized unannounced searches of all electronics (including phones) and required disclosure of passwords.
In Feb–Mar 2019 a tip from his ex-wife led the probation officer (Murray) to review a Facebook account; Murray requested and Lajeunesse handed over his phone; a cursory examination revealed images suggesting child pornography and an encrypted media app, and Murray seized the phone for a forensic exam.
New York State Police, acting as agents of probation, performed a forensic search that uncovered explicit images of minors; Lajeunesse was arrested and a second phone was seized; the FBI later executed a warrant on the second phone and a federal indictment followed.
Lajeunesse pleaded guilty while preserving the right to appeal denial of his suppression motion, but waived appeal of any sentence of 210 months or less; the district court sentenced him to 198 months and did not invite allocution; defense did not object at sentencing.
On appeal the Second Circuit affirmed denial of the suppression motion (searches held reasonable under Knights and the Griffin special-needs framework) but held the appellate waiver did not bar review of the court’s failure to permit allocution and remanded for resentencing to allow allocution.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Were the probation officers’ and state police searches of Lajeunesse’s phone constitutional?	Searches were reasonable under the special-needs doctrine and Knights; probation condition and diminished privacy justified search (and reasonable suspicion existed).	Search required greater protection; probation officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a general forensic search and were limited to social-media violations.	Search was constitutional: probation condition diminished expectation of privacy; Officer Murray had reasonable suspicion under Knights and search also valid under Griffin special-needs.
2) Was the State Police forensic search fruit of the poisonous tree?	The State Police search followed and relied on lawful probation findings and was therefore not tainted.	The second search was tainted because it flowed from an unconstitutional initial search.	Not fruit of the poisonous tree because the initial search was lawful; suppression denied.
3) Does Lajeunesse’s appellate waiver bar his claim that the court denied allocution, and is resentencing required?	The waiver of appeal for sentences ≤210 months bars the claim; enforce waiver.	The waiver did not contemplate deprivation of the statutory/Rule 32 right to allocution; failure to afford allocution requires vacatur and resentencing.	The waiver does not reasonably cover a district-court omission to permit allocution; remand for resentencing so defendant can allocute.

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (probationer’s diminished privacy supports search on reasonable suspicion)
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (special-needs/probation regulation can justify warrantless probation searches)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (consent is a Fourth Amendment exception)
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (parolee searches may be suspicionless under limited circumstances)
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (cell phones afford greater privacy protections; searches incident to arrest require special analysis)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine)
United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (probationary searches permissible under Knights with reasonable suspicion)
United States v. Grimes, 225 F.3d 254 (special-needs analysis and state regulatory framework for probation searches)