United States v. Lafrances O'Neal
2016 WL 7439008
D.C. Cir.2016Background
- O’Neal ran GL Real Estate Development and purchased seven properties (2006–2007) using straw buyers, falsified loan applications, forged appraisals, and misused title-company funds; lenders’ loss ≈ $964,503.
- Indicted on seven counts (conspiracy, bank fraud, mail fraud, first-degree fraud); co-defendant mortgage broker Donald Ramsey pleaded guilty and cooperated at trial.
- At trial, Ramsey testified for the Government; defense sought to recross him about two prior incidents bearing on truthfulness and to introduce another witness’s testimony that Ramsey invited her to participate in “shady” mortgages; the District Court excluded both lines of evidence.
- Jury convicted O’Neal of conspiracy and three counts of bank fraud; acquitted on mail fraud and first-degree fraud. Sentence: 48 months’ imprisonment, 60 months supervised release, restitution; O’Neal appealed.
- Before trial the court conducted competency screenings and extensive Faretta-style colloquies when O’Neal sought to represent herself; she was represented at trial but chose to represent herself at sentencing, prompting an appellate challenge to the validity of her waiver of counsel at sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | O’Neal/Amicus Argument | Government/Respondent Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by disallowing recross about Ramsey’s alleged prior bad acts (Rule 608(b)) | Court wrongly blocked probative 608(b) impeachment about prior misconduct bearing on credibility | Recross privilege is discretionary; proffer was vague and not probative; Rule 403 concerns outweighed admission | No abuse of discretion; recross discretionary, proffer lacked probative detail and raised 403 concerns |
| Whether testimony that Ramsey asked witness to do “shady” loans should have been admitted as impeachment-by-contradiction | Excluding the witness’s statement prevented impeachment that would contradict Ramsey’s depiction of his conduct | Statement did not contradict a specific testimony by Ramsey; extrinsic evidence barred under 608(b) and, even if contradiction, was inadmissible under Rules 401/403 | No abuse of discretion; evidence did not clearly contradict a specific statement and its limited probative value was outweighed by 403 factors |
| Whether O’Neal’s waiver of right to counsel at sentencing was knowing and intelligent (Faretta) | Colloquy was insufficient because court did not explain Sentencing Guidelines and complexities of sentencing | Court adequately warned of dangers of self-representation; lengthy prior colloquies before trial reinforced knowing waiver; no requirement to list every potential difficulty | Waiver was knowing and intelligent; court’s warnings plus earlier proceedings satisfied Faretta principles |
Key Cases Cited
- Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (discusses competency to waive counsel and manage self-representation)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (establishes right to self-representation and requirement court warn of dangers)
- United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 846 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (impeachment-by-contradiction vs. Rule 608(b) constraints)
- United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (standards for knowing, intelligent waiver of counsel)
- United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (court must advise defendant of dangers of self-representation)
- United States v. Bisong, 645 F.3d 384 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (prior colloquies can inform adequacy of later waiver)
- United States v. Ellerbe, 372 F.3d 462 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (right to self-representation applies at sentencing)