United States v. Ladmarald Cates, 973 F.3d 742

Victim Iema Lemons called 911; Officer Ladmarald Cates responded and, while alone with her in her home, Lemons testified Cates forced oral and vaginal sex—grabbing her hair, pushing her toward a sink, and squeezing her neck.
Hospital notes documented neck swelling and bloodshot eyes (suggestive of choking); no vaginal trauma recorded; DNA from Lemons found on Cates’ clothing.
First federal trial: jury convicted Cates on the civil-rights count (18 U.S.C. § 242) by special verdict finding aggravated sexual abuse but also found Lemons did not suffer bodily injury; acquitted on the firearm count; conviction affirmed on direct appeal.
This court later reversed on collateral review because trial counsel failed to object to an erroneous jury instruction that conflated physical force and psychological coercion, and ordered a new trial.
At retrial, after a three-count superseding indictment again charging aggravated sexual abuse, Cates moved to dismiss Count 1 under the Double Jeopardy Clause/issue preclusion, arguing the first jury’s finding of no bodily injury precludes a theory of aggravated sexual abuse based on physical force; the district court denied the motion and this appeal followed.

Issue	Cates' Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the prior jury finding that Lemons did not suffer bodily injury precludes reprosecution on aggravated sexual abuse under § 2241(a)(1) (physical force theory)	The no‑bodily‑injury special verdict necessarily implies no physical force was used, so issue preclusion bars retrying the force theory	The prior verdict did not decide whether physical force occurred; physical force can exist without bodily injury and Lemons’ testimony supports a force finding	Denied: Cates failed to show the prior jury irrationally acquitted on a fact essential to preclude force; evidence could support force without bodily injury, so no double jeopardy bar
Whether the prior verdict precludes reprosecution on aggravated sexual abuse under § 2241(a)(2) (threats/fear theory)	Because the jury acquitted on the firearm count, jurors likely rejected that Cates placed Lemons in fear of death or serious bodily injury	A rational jury could infer Cates knowingly placed Lemons in fear based on his status as an armed officer, size disparity, and Lemons’ testimony about fearing his firearm	Denied: sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Cates knowingly placed Lemons in fear; prior verdict does not preclude the fear/threat theory

United States v. Cates, 716 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2013) (direct appeal decision affirming conviction)
In re Cates v. United States, 882 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2018) (granting new trial due to erroneous aggravated‑sexual‑abuse jury instruction)
United States v. Faulkner, 793 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for double jeopardy dismissal of indictment)
Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009) (issue preclusion component of Double Jeopardy Clause)
Bravo‑Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352 (2016) (burden on defendant to show jury resolved issue in his favor)
United States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1995) (definition of physical force under § 2241(a)(1))
United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d 441 (3d Cir. 2018) (physical force can exist without significant injury)
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (injury and force are imperfectly correlated)
Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144 (2018) (Double Jeopardy requires that it would have been irrational for the prior jury to acquit without deciding an issue in defendant’s favor)
United States v. Uriostegui‑Estrada, 86 F.3d 87 (7th Cir. 1996) (jury may infer knowledge from circumstantial evidence)