United States v. Kyle Olson, 41 F.4th 792

Background

During violent civil unrest in Madison (May 30–31, 2020) officers observed Kyle Olson take a pistol from his car trunk, tuck it into the small of his back, and pull his shirt over it.
Officers Marzullo, Hamilton, and Gatdula approached with weapons drawn, had Olson put his hands on the car, conducted a patdown, recovered a loaded pistol, handcuffed him, and radioed for arrest/transport. ~90 seconds elapsed from decision to approach to arrest.
Olson was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession) and moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an illegal seizure, arguing the encounter was a de facto arrest without probable cause or, alternatively, an investigative stop without reasonable suspicion.
At the suppression hearing officers testified Olson admitted he was a felon before arrest (they also said he made a second admission after arrest); contemporaneous written reports did not record the pre-arrest admission. Magistrate credited officers, citing stress and sleep deprivation to explain report discrepancies.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s factual findings, denied suppression (holding the initial seizure was a Terry stop supported by reasonable suspicion and that the officers’ force was justified by officer safety concerns), and this court affirmed on appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether officers’ use of force converted the stop into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause	Olson: drawing weapons, handcuffing, and securing him immediately made the encounter an arrest from the outset	Government: extreme, violent conditions and observation that Olson was armed justified weapons drawn and restraints during an investigative stop	Court: Use of force did not automatically ripen the stop to an arrest given the dangerous context and observed armed conduct; seizure was a Terry stop
Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop	Olson: officers lacked specific and articulable facts to suspect criminal activity	Government: observed concealment of a firearm, possible intoxication, countersurveillance behavior, and the violent protest context supplied reasonable suspicion	Court: Totality of circumstances (weapon concealment, behavior, and volatile scene) satisfied reasonable suspicion
Timing of Olson’s admission that he was a felon and effect on probable cause for arrest	Olson: his admission occurred only after arrest, so there was no pre-arrest probable cause for arrest for felon-in-possession	Government: officers credibly testified the first admission was pre-arrest, supported by testimony and radio transmissions	Court: Deferential review to magistrate’s live-credibility findings; no clear error in crediting officers that an initial pre-arrest admission occurred
Applicability of the good-faith exception if there were constitutional error	Olson: good-faith exception should not salvage an unlawful seizure	Government: raised good-faith as alternative	Court: Did not decide because no Fourth Amendment violation was found; court affirmed without reaching good-faith issue

Key Cases Cited

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (established investigatory stop standard)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (contextual flight/evasive behavior relevant to reasonable suspicion)
United States v. Richmond, 924 F.3d 404 (reasonable suspicion standard and totality-of-circumstances analysis)
Rabin v. Flynn, 725 F.3d 628 (distinguishing Terry stop from de facto arrest)
United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004 (no automatic conversion to arrest for drawing weapons/handcuffing)
United States v. Shoals, 478 F.3d 850 (officer safety can justify force during Terry stop)
Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517 (assessing whether circumstances support officer’s legitimate fear for safety)
United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616 (deference to credibility findings in suppression hearings)
United States v. Wendt, 465 F.3d 814 (clear-error standard for factual findings and credibility)