United States v. Kwai Fun Wong. United States
575 U.S. 402
SCOTUS2015Background
- Two consolidated FTCA cases: Wong (false imprisonment claim presented to INS timely; attempted to add FTCA claim to pending federal suit but district court delayed amendment past §2401(b)'s 6‑month post‑denial window) and June (wrongful death/state suit; discovered alleged federal involvement years later and presented an FTCA claim more than two years after accrual).
- Both claimants sought equitable tolling of §2401(b)'s time limits (2 years to present to agency; 6 months to sue after agency denial).
- The Government argued §2401(b)'s time limits are jurisdictional—therefore not subject to equitable tolling.
- Ninth Circuit held both FTCA deadlines nonjurisdictional and tolled where equitable tolling was warranted; certiorari granted.
- Supreme Court (majority: Kagan) held FTCA time bars are nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling; remanded for factfinding on tolling in June. Dissent (Alito) would treat §2401(b) as jurisdictional and not tollable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §2401(b) time limits are jurisdictional and thus untollable | Tolling available under Irwin presumption; FTCA deadlines are ordinary limitations rules (Wong/June) | §2401(b) echoes Tucker Act language and historical practice; the phrase "shall be forever barred" and the statute's waiver context make the limits jurisdictional (Government) | Nonjurisdictional; §2401(b) is an ordinary statute-of-limitations claim-processing rule and may be equitably tolled (majority) |
| Whether Irwin's presumption of tolling applies to FTCA time bars | Irwin governs suits against the Government; presumption in favor of tolling unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise (Wong/June) | Irwin should not defeat longstanding judicial construction that analogous limits were jurisdictional; historical practice rebuts Irwin (Government) | Irwin's presumption applies and Congress did not plainly state §2401(b) was jurisdictional; presumption not rebutted (majority) |
| Whether the Tucker Act/identical wording compels a different result | Identical phrasing alone does not show Congress intended to import Tucker Act jurisdictional rule | Identical "shall be forever barred" language and historical treatment of Tucker Act time bar show Congress adopted that jurisdictional meaning | Wording is common to many limitations statutes and not dispositive; prior treatment of Tucker Act stems from stare decisis, not text, so it does not carry over to §2401(b) |
| Remedy on remand for factual tolling claims | Courts should apply equitable-tolling doctrine (diligence + extraordinary circumstances) to determine whether to toll | Government opposes tolling even if facts might justify it | Remand to district court to decide factual entitlement to equitable tolling (majority) |
Key Cases Cited
- Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (presumption that statutory time bars in suits against the United States are subject to equitable tolling)
- John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008) (reaffirmed Tucker Act time limit as jurisdictional based on stare decisis; discussed linguistic similarity to nonjurisdictional provisions)
- American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) (construed "shall be forever barred" language in limitations statute as subject to tolling)
- Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (time bars are ordinarily claim‑processing rules; Congress must clearly state if a rule is jurisdictional)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (clarified the clear‑statement requirement for labeling procedural rules as jurisdictional)
- Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957) (refused to allow equitable tolling under the Tucker Act; discussed broader effects of altering that rule)
- Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. (2012) (courts must enforce jurisdictional bars regardless of equitable considerations)