United States v. Kundo
16-4128
| 10th Cir. | Jul 20, 2017Background
- Kundo pled guilty in 2008 to armed carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119), brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951); sentenced April 8, 2008 to 147 months.
- He did not file a direct appeal; judgment became final April 22, 2008, so the ordinary § 2255 one-year window expired April 22, 2009.
- Kundo filed a § 2255 motion on May 23, 2016, invoking § 2255(f)(3) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson (and Welch’s retroactivity) to argue timeliness.
- On the merits Kundo argued Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA residual clause required invalidation of § 924(c)(3)(B)’s risk-of-force clause as applied to his brandishing enhancement for carjacking.
- The district court found Johnson/Welch applied to revive timeliness but rejected Kundo’s vagueness argument on the merits; the Tenth Circuit instead denied a COA and dismissed on timeliness grounds, concluding Johnson did not “initially recognize” the right Kundo asserts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Kundo) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kundo’s § 2255 motion is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) | Johnson (and Welch’s retroactivity) created a new right that restarted the one-year clock | Johnson did not recognize the specific right Kundo seeks regarding § 924(c)(3)(B) | Motion untimely; § 2255(f)(3) does not apply |
| Whether Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA residual clause controls § 924(c)(3)(B) | The ACCA residual clause and § 924(c)(3)(B) are indistinguishable; § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague | § 924(c)(3)(B) is materially narrower and tied to real-world conduct, so Johnson does not control | Not decided on merits because timeliness forecloses relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson retroactive on collateral review)
- Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013) (defining when a rule is "new" for retroactivity purposes)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (framework for new rules and retroactivity)
- Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065 (10th Cir. 2016) (applied Johnson to § 16(b))
- Taylor v. United States, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (concluded § 924(c)(3)(B) is narrower than ACCA residual clause)
- Prickett v. United States, 839 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2016) (held § 924(c)(3)(B) not unconstitutionally vague post-Johnson)
- Cardena v. United States, 842 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluded § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague)
- Serafin v. United States, 562 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting § 924(c) is narrower than ACCA residual clause)
- Denny v. United States, 694 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2012) (de novo review of § 2255 timeliness)
- Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463 (2012) (courts may raise timeliness sua sponte in certain circumstances)
