902 F.3d 1023
9th Cir.2018Background
- Kechedzian was indicted on two counts of possession of 15+ unauthorized access devices (18 U.S.C. § 1029) and two counts of aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A) after law enforcement found counterfeit cards, skimming equipment, and USB drives with ~1,451 stolen card numbers during searches.
- During voir dire Juror #3 (Rose) disclosed prior identity-theft of her Social Security number and answered repeatedly and equivocally when asked whether she could be fair and impartial (e.g., “I might be able,” “I honestly don’t know if I could,” “I would try to be fair”).
- Defense moved to excuse Juror #3 for cause based on actual and implied bias; the district court denied the challenge and the juror served on the panel.
- The jury convicted Kechedzian; district court sentenced him to 65 months’ imprisonment and ordered $114,134.76 restitution.
- On appeal Kechedzian raised multiple issues but the Ninth Circuit reversed solely on the juror-bias ground, holding Juror #3 should have been excused for actual bias and remanding for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Kechedzian's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Juror #3 should have been excused for actual bias | Juror #3’s repeated equivocal answers and expressed doubt about setting aside her identity-theft experience showed she could not be impartial | The juror ultimately said she would notify the court if she couldn’t be fair and the venire affirmed they could follow legal principles; those facts cure bias concerns | Reversed: juror’s repeated equivocations were insufficient and required excusal for actual bias; new trial ordered |
| Whether juror’s identity-theft alone established implied bias | Juror’s personal victimization plus equivocal answers created actual bias; implied bias also argued | Identity-theft alone does not create the kind of “extraordinary” relationship warranting implied bias | Implied bias not found; decision rests on actual bias analysis |
| Whether a post-selection monitoring arrangement (juror promises to tell judge if biased later) cures equivocal voir dire answers | Such an arrangement is inadequate; voir dire must produce an upfront assurance of impartiality | Government contended the juror’s promise to report bias later was an unqualified affirmative | Held that asking a juror to self-report later is not a substitute for unequivocal assurances during voir dire |
| Whether failure to respond to a later group question about presumption of innocence cured equivocal individual answers | Juror’s silence to a group question does not show ability to be impartial; understanding burden/presumption is distinct from impartiality | Government argued no one, including Juror #3, said they couldn’t follow presumption/burden instructions, implying adequacy | Held silence did not ameliorate earlier equivocations; impartiality concerns remain |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (equivocal juror answers about impartiality required excusal and reversal)
- United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1995) (deference to district court where juror ultimately and credibly affirmed impartiality)
- Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998) (bias of a single juror requires reversal; voir dire protects impartiality)
- United States v. Miguel, 111 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 1997) (district court has broad discretion in excusing jurors for actual bias)