248 F. Supp. 3d 1062
D.N.M.2017Background
- Movant David Louis King was convicted in federal court of being a felon in possession and sentenced (May 26, 2004) to 15 years under the ACCA based on three prior New Mexico convictions, including a 1995 commercial burglary and a 1986 armed robbery.
- King challenged his ACCA-enhanced sentence via 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States ("Samuel Johnson") struck down the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague.
- The Magistrate Judge recommended granting relief: vacating King’s sentence and resentencing without ACCA enhancement. The Government objected and filed supplemental objections after the Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Harris.
- Central legal question: whether New Mexico armed robbery categorically qualifies as a "violent felony" under the ACCA’s elements (force) clause (i.e., whether the statute requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force capable of causing physical pain or injury per Curtis Johnson).
- The court examined New Mexico precedents (Clokey, Curley, Verdugo, Bernal, Duran, Hamilton) and contrasted them with Tenth Circuit and other appellate decisions (Harris, Gardner, Parnell, Ramon Silva) to determine whether New Mexico law permits convictions based on force less than Curtis Johnson physical force.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether New Mexico armed robbery is a "violent felony" under ACCA elements clause | King: New Mexico robbery/armed robbery can be based on minimal force (purse-snatchings) and therefore does not categorically require Curtis Johnson "violent force," so it cannot serve as an ACCA predicate after Samuel Johnson | Gov't: Robbery is common-law-based and inherently violent; armed robbery (possession of a deadly weapon) supplies the required threatened or violent force | Held: New Mexico armed robbery does not categorically require the Curtis Johnson level of force; ACCA enhancement cannot rest on that conviction |
| Whether the "armed with a deadly weapon" element means use (thus satisfying elements clause) | King: New Mexico cases interpret "armed with" as possession, not necessarily use, so mere possession does not categorically communicate a threat of violent force | Gov't: The armed element elevates robbery and thus supplies the necessary violent-force element | Held: "Armed with" in New Mexico law means possession/readily available weapon, not necessarily use; possession alone does not meet the elements-clause requirement |
| Whether pre-Curtis-Johnson Tenth Circuit authority (e.g., Lujan) binds this court | King: Curtis Johnson changed the legal meaning of "physical force," requiring reanalysis | Gov't: Prior circuit precedent supports treating New Mexico robbery as violent | Held: Curtis Johnson is a superseding Supreme Court decision that requires reanalysis; pre-Curtis decisions do not control the new categorical inquiry |
| Whether other district/circuit decisions (Harris, Gardner, Parnell, Ramon Silva) compel a contrary result | King: Harris supports distinguishing Colorado (violent) from other states; many New Mexico cases show force can be minimal | Gov't: Harris and other authorities support treating robbery as violent | Held: Court finds Harris distinguishable and concludes its analysis supports vacating the enhancement here; Ramon Silva and others are distinguishable or predate Samuel Johnson and cannot be stretched to cover New Mexico armed robbery |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) (struck down ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (Curtis Johnson) (held "physical force" means violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
- United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2017) (analyzed Colorado robbery under Curtis Johnson; distinguished lesser-force precedents)
- United States v. Gardner, 823 F.3d 793 (4th Cir. 2016) (held North Carolina robbery not a violent felony under elements clause)
- United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2016) (Massachusetts armed-robbery possession-only statutes do not categorically meet elements clause)
- United States v. Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d 663 (10th Cir. 2010) (aggravated assault with deadly weapon is a violent felony; reasoning limited to statutes requiring use/threat with a weapon)
- Lujan v. United States, 9 F.3d 890 (10th Cir. 1993) (pre-Curtis decision treating New Mexico robbery as violent; superseded for purposes of the Curtis Johnson analysis)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach presumes conviction rests on least culpable conduct)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016) (approved modified categorical approach for statutes with alternative elements)